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 Regurgitated food sharing among vampire bats is a classic textbook example 
of reciprocity (“reciprocal altruism”). But many authors have contested both the 
notion that reciprocity explains vampire bat food-sharing and the importance of 
reciprocity more generally. In Chapter 1, I review the literature on evolutionary 
explanations of cooperation. I show why reciprocity was once considered important 
but is now considered rare: overly literal translations of game theory strategies have 
resulted in problems for both defining and testing reciprocity. In Chapter 2, I examine 
the relative roles of social predictors of food-sharing decisions by common vampire 
bats (Desmodus rotundus) under controlled conditions of mixed relatedness and equal 
familiarity by fasting 20 individuals in 48 trials over two years. The food-sharing 
network was consistent, symmetrical, and correlated with mutual allogrooming. Non-
kin food-sharing patterns were not consistent with harassment or byproduct 
explanations. I next attempted to manipulate food-sharing decisions in two ways. In 
Chapter 3, I administered intranasal oxytocin to test for effects on allogrooming and 
food sharing. I observed that inhaled oxytocin slightly increased the magnitude of 
  
food donations within dyads, and the amount of female allogrooming within and 
across all partners, without increasing number of partners. In Chapter 4, I assessed 
contingency of food-sharing in 7 female dyads (including four pairs of mother and 
adult daughters) with prior histories of sharing. To test for evidence of partner 
switching, I measured dyadic levels of food sharing before and after a treatment 
period where I prevented dyadic sharing (each bat could only be fed by others). A 
bat’s sharing network size predicted how much food it received in the experiment. 
When primary donors were excluded, subjects did not compensate with donations 
from other partners. Yet, food-sharing bonds appeared unaffected by the non-sharing 
treatment. In particular, close maternal kin were clearly not enforcing cooperation 
using strict contingency. I argue that any contingencies within such bonds are likely 
to involve multiple services and long timescales, making them difficult to detect. 
Simple and dyadic ‘tit-for-tat’ models are unlikely to predict cooperative decisions by 
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Chapter 1 was previously published in 2014 as “The reciprocity controversy” in 
Animal Behavior and Cognition (vol 1, 368-386). Chapter 2 was published in 2013 as 
“Food sharing in vampire bats: Reciprocal help predicts donations more than 
relatedness or harassment” in Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences (vol 280, 20122573). Chapters 3 and 4 are in manuscript form. The 
Introduction and Appendix 1 includes altered text and tables from the article “Does 
food sharing in vampire bats demonstrate reciprocity?” published in Communicative 
& Integrative Biology (vol 6., e25783). Appendix 2 is published as an online 
supplement to the paper published as Chapter 2. Appendix 3 and 4 are written as 
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 What are the evolutionary advantages of helping others? This question has 
been central to evolutionary biology since Darwin (1871) first realized that altruistic, 
non-reproductive workers in eusocial insect societies posed a “special difficulty” to 
his theory of natural selection (see an excellent review by Ratnieks et al. 2011). The 
puzzle of altruism was solved by Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory. But it 
took almost another decade for evolutionary biologists to realize that non-altruistic 
mutually beneficial cooperation led to its own, perhaps even more vexing, puzzle 
(Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). Inclusive fitness theory explains that 
helping between non-kin must yield direct fitness benefits, but not how. In many 
cases, cooperative traits or behaviors lead to a public good that can be exploited by 
less cooperative individuals, rendering the cooperative trait evolutionarily unstable 
unless there is mechanism for preventing such freeloading or “cheating” (West et al. 
2007, Ghoul et al. 2013). This situation has been explained using the “prisoner’s 
dilemma” and “snowdrift game” for two individuals or the “tragedy of the commons” 
for a group of individuals (e.g. Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Dugatkin 1997, Foster 
2004, Doebeli & Hauert 2005, West et al. 2007). 
 One solution to the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated interactions combined with 
reciprocity or “reciprocal altruism” (Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). This is 
most obvious in human societies, where cooperative behaviors such as food sharing 
are often enforced by reciprocity (Trivers 1971, Gurven 2004, 2006). By making 
small sacrifices to help certain individuals, humans consciously or unconsciously 




and yield reciprocal benefits in the long-term. Such reciprocity requires that 
cooperative investments are ultimately contingent on cooperative returns.  
 One of the earliest and most classic empirical examples of reciprocity is food 
sharing by regurgitation of blood among common vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus). 
When adult female or young vampire bats miss a nightly meal, female roostmates will 
typically regurgitate some of their own blood meal to feed them (Wilkinson 1984). 
Field observations show that female donors regurgitate food mostly for their own 
offspring (70% of cases) but also for other familiar adult females. This adult sharing 
is predicted independently by both relatedness and co-roosting association (Wilkinson 
1984). Reciprocal food sharing in vampire bats is frequently cited as an example of 
reciprocity, but it also demonstrates kin discrimination; despite the majority of 
possible donors being unrelated, more than 95% of food sharing occurred between 
close relatives (r < 0.25, Wilkinson 1984). On the other hand, a fasting experiment 
showed that reciprocal sharing also readily occurs among non-kin, suggesting that the 
bats might base their helping decisions on past social experience of help rather than 
only relatedness cues (Wilkinson 1984). Simulations show that, if help is indeed 
based on association, the resulting direct fitness benefits would greatly exceed the 
indirect fitness (kin-selected) benefits (Wilkinson 1988). But others have proposed 
that food sharing between non-kin only occurs due to kin recognition errors 
(Hammerstein 2003), harassment of potential donors (Clutton-Brock 2009), or an 





 Claims of reciprocity in vampire bats, and in other nonhuman animals more 
generally, are controversial for several reasons. In Chapter 1, I review the literature 
on reciprocity and alternative evolutionary explanations of cooperation. I show that 
reciprocity was once considered important and widespread but is now considered rare 
for almost completely semantic reasons. Literal translations of the strategy ‘tit-for-tat’ 
in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game have resulted in four problematic 
approaches to defining and testing reciprocity. I call these: the calculated reciprocity 
error (the assumption that reciprocity requires sophisticated cognitive abilities to plan 
ahead and properly discount future rewards), the short-term contingency bias (the 
idea that reciprocity must involve strict-turn-taking), the temporary fitness cost 
paradox (the requirement that tests of reciprocity show both the presence of cheating 
and that reciprocity prevents cheating), and finally, the byproduct ambiguity (the 
observation that any evidence for reciprocity can be reinterpreted post hoc as 
“pseudoreciprocity” where cooperative investments do not cause reciprocal 
cooperative returns, but merely enable them because no cheating exists). 
 In Chapter 2, I revisit the case of food sharing in vampire bats by examining 
social predictors of food-sharing decisions by common vampire bats (Desmodus 
rotundus) under controlled conditions of mixed relatedness and equal familiarity. I 
fasted 20 individuals in 48 trials over two years. I show that donors often greeted and 
initiated grooming and sharing with unfed bats; that the food-sharing network was 
consistent, symmetrical, and correlated with mutual allogrooming; that reciprocal 
help is a much stronger predictor of food sharing than kinship; and that non-kin 




reciprocity hypothesis, such with harassment, group augmentation, or simple kin 
recognition errors. Results were consistent with the reciprocity hypothesis, but do not 
demonstrate contingency. Such a demonstration requires manipulating investments to 
elicit a behavioral response. 
 I attempted to manipulate food-sharing decisions in two ways. In Chapter 3, I 
administered intranasal oxytocin (OT) to test for increases in allogrooming and food 
sharing. There was no effect on the occurrence of sharing among dyads, but in the 
sharing events that did occur, I found that OT increased the magnitude of food 
donations within dyads, after controlling for dyad and amount of allogrooming. OT 
also increased the amount of female allogrooming per partner and across all partners, 
but not the number of partners. These results were promising, but suggested that OT 
treatments alone could not strongly manipulate food-sharing decisions. 
 In Chapter 4, I took a first step in the difficult tasking of testing contingency 
in reciprocal food sharing. Preliminary trials showed that vampire bat dyads and 
triads that always shared in the group setting of their home cage would not share food 
when isolated as dyads or triads in small cages, even after many days of habituation 
to the new setting. I therefore tested contingency using experimental dyads embedded 
in a group setting with multiple partners. I selected 7 female dyads (including four 
pairs of mother and adult daughters) with prior histories of sharing and tried to see if I 
could get these bats to invest more in other partners. To test for evidence of such 
partner switching, I measured dyadic levels of food sharing before and after a 
treatment period where dyadic sharing was prevented, because their paired donor was 




network predicted total food received in the experiment. When primary donors were 
excluded, subjects did not fully compensate with donations from other bats. After 
preventing dyadic sharing on 3 occasions over 3 weeks, food-sharing bonds appeared 
unaffected. In particular, close maternal kin were clearly not enforcing cooperation 
using strict contingency based on their most recent fasting experience.   
 Data from Chapter 4 are consistent with the idea from Chapter 1 that stable 
social bonds might influence reciprocity in several important ways. First, socially 
bonded individuals can integrate multiple cooperative services. For instance, evidence 
from primates suggests that imbalances in food sharing can be compensated by 
allogrooming (e.g. Fruteau et al. 2009). In vampire bats, food sharing is also predicted 
by allogrooming (Chapter 2, especially among non-kin: Chapter 4, Appendix 4), and 
sharing and allogrooming are influenced by a common hormonal mechanism 
(Chapter 3). Second, stable bonds should reduce the degree of contingency in the 
short-term and lengthen the timescale of reciprocation. In vampire bats, reciprocal 
patterns become stronger over longer timespans (Chapter 2), and sharing bonds are 
robust to recent periods of non-sharing (Chapter 4). Third, the value of social bonds 
and any constraint on the number of bonds an animal can maintain makes partner 
choice a potent force for stabilizing cooperation (Noë & Hammerstein 1994). 
Vampire bats with larger networks are more successful at obtaining food, primary 
partners are not quickly replaceable, and sharing bonds are stable to three successive 
non-sharing events (Chapter 4). Together, these results show that vampire bat 






Chapter 1: The reciprocity controversy 
Abstract 
Reciprocity (or “reciprocal altruism”) was once considered an important and 
widespread evolutionary explanation for cooperation, yet many reviews now 
conclude that it is rare or absent outside of humans. Here, I show that nonhuman 
reciprocity seems rare mainly because its meaning has changed over time. The 
original broad concept of reciprocity is well supported by evidence, but subsequent 
divergent uses of the term have relied on various translations of the strategy ‘tit-for-
tat’ in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This model has resulted in four 
problematic approaches to defining and testing reciprocity. Authors that deny 
evidence of nonhuman reciprocity tend to (1) assume that it requires sophisticated 
cognition, (2) focus exclusively on short-term contingency with a single partner, (3) 
require paradoxical evidence for a temporary lifetime fitness cost, and (4) assume that 
responses to investments are fixed. While these restrictions basically define 
reciprocity out of existence, evidence shows that fungi, plants, fish, birds, rats, and 
primates enforce mutual benefit by contingently altering their cooperative 








 Comparative psychologists, evolutionary psychologists, and behavioral 
ecologists often study cooperation using different theories and methods, asking 
questions at different levels of analysis. What cues trigger the cooperative behavior? 
How does it develop? When did it evolve? Why is it adaptive? The multidisciplinary 
nature of this field leads to new connections but also miscommunication. For 
instance, some semantic confusion occurs because comparative psychologists often 
define behaviors such as ‘cooperation’, ‘altruism’, and ‘mutualism’ based on 
proximate goals or motivations, similar to their colloquial usage (de Waal, 2008), 
whereas evolutionary biologists define these terms based on the ultimate net effects 
on direct fitness (i.e. lifetime reproductive success, West, Griffin, & Gardner, 
2007a,b). Many misunderstandings resulting from these semantic discrepancies have 
been resolved elsewhere (see Noë, 2006, West, El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011; West et 
al., 2007b), but one important concept that continues to cause confusion is 
‘reciprocity’ (or ‘reciprocal altruism’ Trivers, 1971). 
 Reciprocity is one of the best-known evolutionary explanations for 
cooperation, but also among the most controversial (Cheney, 2011; Clutton-Brock, 
2009; Hammerstein, 2003; Schino & Aureli 2010a,b). Although once considered the 
key explanation for helping between non-kin, most reviews now conclude that it is 
absent or very rare outside of humans (e.g., Clutton-Brock, 2009; West et al., 2011). 
All claims of reciprocity have been disputed, including experimental evidence from 
fish (reviewed by Dugatkin, 1997), rodents (Rutte & Taborksy, 2008), birds (Krama 




(reviewed by de Waal & Suchak, 2010; Schino & Aureli 2008, 2009). As a 
consequence, theorists attempt to explain why reciprocity is so rare (André, 2014), 
while others view reciprocity as an important and underappreciated mechanism for 
cooperation (Schino & Aureli, 2010a,b; Taborsky, 2013). 
 Reciprocity assumes that cooperative investments can be exploited if the 
recipients do not provide adequate cooperative returns back to the actor (i.e., 
‘cheating’ Ghoul, Griffin, & West, 2013), and it predicts that individuals will 
therefore adjust these investments contingent on the returns received from their 
partners. Some authors contrast ‘direct reciprocity’ (A helps B because B helps A) 
with ‘indirect reciprocity’ (A helps B because B helps C) or ‘generalized reciprocity’ 
(A helps B because A was helped), and some authors separate positive reciprocity 
(contingent reward) from negative reciprocity (contingent punishment). The tendency 
of humans to both cooperate and punish non-cooperators, even at a cost or in one-shot 
economic games, has been called ‘strong reciprocity’ (reviewed by West et al., 
2007b, 2011). Here, I focus exclusively on ‘direct reciprocity’ and do not distinguish 







Box 1. Glossary 
 
Altruism: cooperation that on average decreases the actor’s direct fitness. 
 
Byproduct mutualism: mutual benefits that are incidental (the traits or behaviors 
were not shaped by natural selection to provide benefits to others). 
 
Cooperation: a behavior or trait that on average increases the inclusive fitness of 
both the actor and the recipient; includes altruism and mutualism. 
 
Cooperative investment: an action that aids a recipient and functions to provide a 
cooperative return to the actor. 
 
Cooperative return: an action by a recipient of a cooperative investment that 
increases the investor’s direct fitness. 
 
Direct fitness: lifetime reproductive success; number of total offspring that survive 
until adulthood. 
 
Enforcement mechanism: a behavior or ability that functions to ensure that 
cooperative investments yield an indirect or direct fitness return (enforcement 
prevents cheating).  
 
Cheating: occurs when a cooperative investment decreases the helper’s inclusive 
fitness (the recipients do not provide a cooperative return or are not the intended 
recipients). 
 
Inclusive fitness: the sum of direct and indirect fitness (traits are adaptive when they 
increase inclusive fitness).  
 
Indirect fitness: the component of inclusive fitness gained from helping relatives. 
 
Mutualism: cooperation that on average increases the direct fitness of the actor and 
recipient. 
 
Pseudoreciprocity: unconditional cooperative investments that enable an inevitable 
byproduct return (no cheating and no enforcement). 
 
Reciprocity: contingent cooperative investments that are based on the cooperative 
returns (enforcement through partner control and/or partner choice). 
 
 
 The reciprocity controversy depends more on semantic disagreements than on 




concept of reciprocity was broad (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971), 
operational definitions gradually diverged and became narrower in meaning, but these 
multiple definitions are now used interchangeably, resulting in confusion. Most 
studies of reciprocity have tested if the short-term payoffs of a given scenario in 
nature fit the Prisoner’s Dilemma game structure and if the behavior of organisms 
follows the strategy “tit-for-tat” (cooperate, then copy partner’s last move). This 
model of reciprocity has led to four problematic distinctions that have essentially 
defined ‘reciprocity’ out of existence. First, some animal behavior researchers have 
taken the play of economic games very literally and assume that reciprocity is an 
intentional strategy requiring an understanding of game payoffs and the ability to 
keep score, plan ahead, and delay gratification (I call this ‘the calculated reciprocity 
error’). Second, some operational definitions focus exclusively on short-term 
contingency with a single partner while ignoring factors such as partner choice, 
power asymmetries, and foundations of prior experience (‘the short-term contingency 
bias’). Third, some definitions require demonstrating that an adaptive helping 
behavior reduces lifetime fitness but only in the short-term (‘the temporary fitness 
cost paradox’). Finally, endless controversy concerns whether the returns on a 
cooperative investment are costly and strategically enforced (reciprocity) or self-
serving and inevitable (pseudoreciprocity), a distinction that can be semantic (‘the 







 Robert Trivers (1971) coined the term ‘reciprocal altruism’ to explain how 
apparently altruistic behavior could evolve between non-kin. ‘Reciprocal altruism’ is 
not a form of altruism in the evolutionary sense (sensu Hamilton, 1964) because it 
does not decrease lifetime direct fitness. Many authors therefore prefer the term 
‘reciprocity’ (Alexander, 1974; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; West et al., 2007a,b). The 
choice of the term ‘reciprocal altruism’ has likely led to at least some of the confusion 
that reciprocity is an alternative to mutual benefit, rather than a way of enforcing it 
(West et al., 2007b).  
 Trivers (1971) defined ‘reciprocal altruism’ in both narrow and broad terms. 
In the narrowest sense, he described various ways that it could operate in humans. In 
the broadest sense, he considered almost any case of a delayed mutual benefit to 
support the theory. For example, he imagined a hypothetical scenario in which a bird 
benefits from alarm calling because the act somehow makes a predator less likely to 
target the caller in the future. In his description, any social benefit to other birds was 
an incidental byproduct, a form of cooperation now called byproduct mutualism 
(Brown, 1983; Connor, 1986, 1995a; West-Eberhard, 1975). Modern usage of the 
term reciprocity excludes simple byproduct mutualisms, and Trivers (2006) later 
clarified this point himself.  
 Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) modeled reciprocity using the simple strategy 
“tit for tat” in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game, each player chooses to 
‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’ and receives a different payoff depending on the other’s 




for mutual cooperation), cooperate with defector (S, sucker’s payoff), defect against 
cooperator (T, temptation to defect), or both players defect (P, punishment for mutual 
defection). In the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, T > R > P > S, and defection is the 
only stable strategy. If the game is repeated in a series of continual rounds, then “tit 
for tat” (cooperate on first round, then copy player’s last move) can outcompete 
“always defect” and many other strategies.  
 This model led to an explosion of subsequent game theory models for 
cooperation. Reciprocity was soon equated with both game theory and tit for tat. Yet 
it was still unclear exactly what constituted empirical evidence for reciprocity and 
how best to translate game theory to experiment. The ambiguity in defining 
reciprocity led to a workshop meeting where leading researchers concluded that 
reciprocity “might be very rare and restricted to a few groups, or it might be quite 
common and widespread – this depends on how the phenomenon is defined and the 
importance attributed to animals’ intentions” (Taylor & McGuire, 1988, p. 69). 
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) considered reciprocity broadly applicable to 
cooperation between neighboring male songbirds, interspecific mutualisms, microbes, 
viruses, and even chromosomes.  
 Several authors argued that the original definition of reciprocity was too broad 
(e.g., Koenig, 1988; Waltz 1981). These researchers thought the term had become too 
inclusive, because behaviors such as monogamy (Ligon 1983), mutual restraint of 
aggression (Lombardo, 1985), and sex (West-Eberhard, 1975) were being labeled as 




should be used only for acts of helping that pose fitness costs to the helper (Koenig, 
1988; Wilkinson, 1988).  
 By the 1990s, some reviews claimed that reciprocity was common (e.g., 
Dugatkin, 1997) while others argued that it was rare (e.g., Clements & Stephens, 
1995). In most cases, the controversy involved whether a particular behavior actually 
conforms to tit-for-tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (reviewed by Noë, 2006; Pusey & 
Packer, 1997; Raihani & Bshary, 2011). By the mid-2000s, interest in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game as a model for cooperation had begun to decline due to the difficulty 
in translating theory to reality (Noë, 2006, Raihani & Bshary, 2011). Trivers (2006) 
lamented that: 
 
 Theorists and empiricists alike were forgetting that iterated games of PD amount to 
a highly artificial model of social interactions; each successive interaction 
simultaneous, costs and benefits never varying, options limited to only two moves, no 
errors, no escalated punishment, no population variability within traits and so on. In 
fact, almost all of these simplifying assumptions have now been shown to introduce 
important effects. (p. 70). 
 
 As game-theoretical models grew increasingly detached from empirical work 
(e.g., Nowak, 2006), the term reciprocity, now associated with such models, fell out 





 We do not need more convoluted theoretical analyses of games such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, snow drift, etc. … games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
its solution with various forms of reciprocity make a large number of extremely 
specific and often unrealistic assumptions. (p. R669). 
 
 Yet at the same time, work on interspecific mutualisms was accumulating a 
great deal of evidence that cooperative investments are indeed contingent on variable 
cooperative returns (Box 2). But the term ‘reciprocity’ was rarely used here. Instead, 
researchers referred to ‘sanctions’ (Kiers, Rosseau, West, & Denison, 2003), 
‘reciprocal rewards’ (Kiers et al., 2011), and ‘partner choice’ (Noë & Hammerstein, 
2001). Reciprocity is now largely equated with intraspecific, rather than interspecific 
cooperation even though it was applied originally to both (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Trivers, 1971).  
 Experimental studies on cooperative exchanges among fish, plants, fungi and 
bacteria have tested the behavioral response to simulated cheating by making one 
partner able to receive, but not reciprocate, a cooperative investment (e.g., Kiers et 
al., 2003, 2011). The results of such studies have shown that partner choice, partner 
switching, and partner control (reward and punishment of a single partner), as well as 
various byproduct benefits that depend on ecological circumstances, can all play key 
roles in stabilizing cooperation (Box 2). These results clearly illustrate that 
enforcement mechanisms are often necessary to stabilize cooperation and complex 




Such studies also demonstrated the utility of viewing cooperation using the metaphor 
of investment, exchange, supply, and demand. This approach was developed by 
biological market theory (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994, 1995, 2001) and has provided 
some of the clearest predictions regarding cooperation both between and within 
species (e.g., Fruteau, Voelkl, Van Damme, & Noë, 2009; Kiers et al., 2011). 
Biological market models have now largely replaced the prisoner’s dilemma and 






Box 2. Examples of contingent cooperative exchanges in intraspecific mutualisms 
In the cleaner-client fish mutualism, small cleaners cooperatively eat dead skin off 
larger ‘client’ fish, but can also ‘cheat’ by eating mucus or live tissue (Grutter, 1999). 
Both cleaners and clients enforce cooperation. Clients abandon or punish cleaners that 
cheat and avoid cleaners that they observe cheating (Bshary & Grutter, 2002a, 2005, 
2006). Cleaners remember the time, location, and quality of client interactions 
(Salwiczek & Bshary, 2011), behave more cooperatively when observed by non-
resident clients (Bshary & Grutter, 2006, Pinto, Oates, Grutter, & Bshary, 2011), 
increase cooperation by punishing other cleaners (Bshary, Grutter, Willemer, & 
Leimar, 2008, Raihani, Grutter, & Bshary, 2010), and adjust the extent of third-party 
punishment to client value and the size of conspecific partners (Raihani, Pinto, 
Grutter, Wismer, & Bshary, 2012).  
 
Plants exchange resources with several symbiotic partners, including mycorrhizal 
fungi, rhizobia bacteria, and pollinating insects. By diverting resources to different 
structures, plants selectively kill symbionts that do not provide returns ('sanctions', 
Kiers et al., 2003; see also Goto, Okamoto, Toby Kiers, Kawakita, & Kato, 2010; 
Jandér & Herre, 2010). In other cases, contingent enforcement is reciprocal; in the 
plant-mycorrhizal fungi mutualism, both partners reward high returns and punish low 
returns (Hammer, Pallon, Wallander, & Olsson, 2011; Kiers et al., 2011). 
Importantly, the contingent investments are often continuous rather than discrete such 
that the intensity of sanctions matches the amount of the return (Kiers, Rosseau, & 
Denison, 2006).  
 
In the acacia-ant mutualism, a host plant exchanges nectar for defense by ants. Even 
before enforcement is considered, cheating is already inhibited by a byproduct 
benefit; the aggressiveness of ants is linked to both their ability to defend host plants 
and to outcompete less aggressive ant species (Heil, 2013). However, plants still 
possess several enforcement strategies. They produce nectars that are difficult to 
digest for non-mutualists (Orona-Tamayo et al., 2013), and these nectars also 
manipulate the digestive system of their ant mutualists towards dependency on the 
nectar rewards (Heil, Barajas-Barron, Orona-Tamayo, Wielsch, & Svatos, 2103). On 
the other end, ant strategies of partner control appear to include contingent defense of 







The Calculated Reciprocity Error 
 Recent authors have argued that reciprocity requires sophisticated cognitive 
abilities for making planned intentional investments with an expectation of a future 
reward (e.g., Hauser, McAuliffe, & Blake, 2009; Ramseyer, Pelé, Dufour, Chauvin, 
& Thierry, 2006; Russell & Wright, 2009; Stevens, Cushman, & Hauser, 2005; 
Stevens & Hauser, 2004). For example, Stevens and Hauser (2004) stress that 
reciprocity is potentially limited by capacities for “numerical discrimination, time 
estimation, delayed gratification, detection and punishment of cheaters, analysis and 
recall of reputation, and inhibitory control.” This ‘calculated reciprocity’ (de Waal & 
Luttrell, 1988) leads to an operational definition that requires testing that an animal 
can strategically resist the temptation to defect to obtain a delayed social reward, even 
under extremely artificial conditions. For instance, experiments found that blue jays 
did not learn to perform a tit for tat strategy in an operant conditioning paradigm that 
mimicked a Prisoner’s Dilemma in the absence of any natural or social cues 
(Clements & Stephens, 1995; Stephens, McLinn, & Stevens, 2002, reviewed by Noë, 
2006). Evidence for calculated reciprocity in nonhuman animals under these 
conditions is rare (e.g., Hauser et al., 2009, but see Dufour, Pelé, Neumann, Thierry, 
& Call, 2009). This evidence has been used to suggest that reciprocity might be rare 
in nature, but this conclusion assumes that all reciprocity is calculated reciprocity and 
acquired through associative learning.  
 The alternative view is that the ‘calculations’ required for reciprocity occur 
not via associative learning alone, but through task-specific adaptations, which 




view, reciprocity occurs as a species-specific cognitive specialization similar to 
evolved mechanisms for mate choice, navigation, or kin recognition. For example, the 
extraordinary species-specific abilities of food-caching birds to remember thousands 
of cache locations over months is not constrained by the supposed difficulties of long-
term memory, delaying gratification, and planning for the future (Bednekoff, Balda, 
Kamil, & Hile, 1997).  
 With this in mind, Stevens et al. (2005) acknowledged that “we should expect 
to find reciprocity and punishment in instances where adaptation has overcome the 
initial cognitive constraints – where narrowly tailored cognitive mechanisms have 
evolved to support specific behavioral routines (p. 512).” The controversy over the 
cognitive constraints on reciprocity therefore rests on deeper controversies over how 
easily adaptation overcomes cognitive constraints and how often social behaviors rely 
on context-specific adaptive specializations rather than on associative learning (e.g., 
Magphail & Bolhuis, 2001).  
 An adaptationist view is that associative learning cannot fully explain 
reciprocity. Consider that kin discrimination (which is often based on prior 
association) requires different adaptive designs for different taxa. This results not 
only from physical constraints (e.g., plants don’t have brains), but also differing 
ecological requirements (e.g., location-based offspring recognition can work for 
stationary bank swallow nestlings but not mobile penguin chicks). Even when 
reciprocity is based on learning the relative payoffs of helping through operant 
conditioning, this learning process will likely be shaped by natural selection, such that 




consistent with the finding that adult cleaner fish outperform juvenile cleaners and 
several primates at learning a cooperative task that simulates the payoffs that cleaners 
regularly face in nature (Salwiczek et al., 2012).  
Calculated reciprocity in humans.  
 Even in humans, calculated reciprocity in humans often appears ‘instinctive’, 
subconscious, and context-specific. Rather than relying on strategic self-control, 
many human prosocial behaviors are fast, intuitive, and built into our basic emotions 
(Frank, 1988; Trivers, 1971). Reasoning through a logic puzzle is slow and difficult 
compared to the way insight is quickly gained about the same logical problem framed 
as a social exchange (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Testing 
calculated reciprocity-- by placing people in Prisoner’s Dilemma or other economic 
games—often leads to irrational decisions which appear to reflect decisions that 
would be optimal under more natural circumstances (Burton-Chellew & West, 2012, 
2013). Humans treat single-shot economic games as if they might be repeated 
(Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2011). Cooperative outcomes in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma are inherently more rewarding and activate distinct reward 
regions in the brain when the payoffs occur with a human partner rather than with a 
computer (Abric & Kahan, 1972; Rilling et al., 2002). In stark contrast to avoiding a 
temptation to defect, most defectors feel an initial impulse to cooperate (Rand, 
Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Cooperative decisions to donate to public goods are 
influenced by irrational audience cues (e.g., pictures of eyes, Bateson, Nettle, & 
Roberts, 2006; Haley & Fessler, 2005) or cues to group competition (Burton-Chellew 




decision-making subconsciously rely on cues that would have maximized inclusive 
fitness in ancestral environments. In short, the payoffs as given by an experiment are 
not always the payoffs that are perceived by animal minds. 
 Similarly, social birds and mammals probably engage different neurocognitive 
mechanisms when learning that food can be obtained by grooming others versus 
pecking keys. The importance of ecological and social cues is therefore extremely 
relevant for reciprocity tests in both human and animal subjects. This likely explains 
why reciprocity experiments in nonhuman primates are more likely to find evidence 
for short-term contingency when the experimenters test natural helping behaviors in a 
group setting rather than use artificial designs with paired subjects performing 
instrumental tasks (Jaeggi, De Groot, Stevens, & Van Schaik, 2012). 
 
The Short-term Contingency Bias 
 There is abundant and growing evidence for symmetrical patterns of helping 
at the group level (‘symmetry-based reciprocity,’ de Waal & Luttrell, 1988), which 
are consistent with reciprocity but not by kinship biases (e.g., bats: Wilkinson 1984, 
Carter & Wilkinson, 2013a,b,c; corvids: Fraser & Bugnyar, 2012; Scheid et al., 2008; 
primates: Gomes, Mundry, & Boesch, 2009; Schino & Aureli, 2008). However, such 
correlations tell us little about causation.  
 Experimental studies have historically emphasized short-term alternation of 
helping acts with a single partner, especially in primates (reviewed by de Waal & 
Brosnan, 2006; de Waal & Suchak, 2010; Schino & Aureli, 2009). For example, 




defined as when “parties mirror each other’s social attitudes with a high degree of 
short-term contingency” (de Waal & Suchak, 2010). However, an overemphasis on 
short-term alternating exchange can ignore the roles of prior long-term social 
relationships and partner choice. 
Contingency in a human friendship.  
 Studies of how reciprocity works in humans can guide our expectations about 
what to expect in other primates or vertebrates. Whereas calculated reciprocity is used 
in human trade, most human social relationships (e.g. communal relationships, Clark 
& Mills, 1979) are likely enforced by attitudinal reciprocity. Trivers (1971) used 
reciprocity to explain friendship and moral emotions such as guilt, shame, gratitude, 
sympathy, and trust. But subsequent authors (e.g., Silk, 2003) have suggested that 
reciprocity cannot explain friendship because friends do not appear to closely track 
favors (the calculated reciprocity error). Humans express a stronger obligation to 
repay favors to strangers, while exchanges of goods or services in human friendships 
are often implicit, delayed, imprecise, and even offensive and taboo if they are 
explicit (Boster, Rodriguez, Cruz, & Marshall, 1995; Shackelford & Buss, 1996; Silk 
2003). Why might this be?  
 One explanation is that a desire to immediately repay social debt signals that 
future interactions are not expected. Concealing expectations of ‘exchange’ might 
also function similarly to indirect speech (Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008): it allows 
people to negotiate topics of implicit social conflict while maintaining plausible 




term exchange of social support services for the same reason that dating does not 
involve explicit discussion of reproduction. 
 Although often implicit, reciprocity is clearly embedded within the 
psychology of human friendships; social investments are affected by changes in the 
ability of friends to reciprocate, the availability of alternative friends, and the need for 
social support (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Frank, 1988; Shackelford & Buss, 
1996; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). Humans tolerate short-term imbalances with friends 
more than strangers and track the cooperative acts of strangers more than friends, but 
they still track the investments of friends (Xue & Silk, 2012). The same can likely be 
said for other kinds of social relationships such as between spouses or siblings. 
Contingency in a long-term animal relationship.  
 Many nonhuman animals possess long-term cooperative social bonds that are 
functionally analogous to human friendships. Such long-term cooperative social 
bonds (henceforth “social bonds”) are well described in chimpanzees and baboons 
(Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012), and there is also evidence for their existence in 
macaques, capuchin monkeys, elephants, feral horses, hyena, dolphins, bats, corvids, 
and mice (Braun & Bugnyar, 2012; Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c; Fraser & Bugnyar, 
2012; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012; Weidt, Hofmann, König, 2008; Weidt, Lindholm, & 
König, 2014). Field studies have demonstrated that strong social bonds provide clear 
fitness benefits (e.g., Cameron, Setsaas, & Linklater, 2009; Schülke, Bhagavatula, 
Vigilant, & Ostner, 2010; Silk et al., 2010).  
 Long-term social bonds are often better than recent social experience at 




2011; Sabbatini, Vizioli, Visalberghi, & Schino, 2012; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012). 
Partner fidelity through social bonding reduces social risks and facilitates the 
exchange of multiple cooperative investments such as information transfer, social 
thermoregulation and grooming, cooperative foraging and food sharing, and 
protection from predators and hostile conspecifics. Several primatologists have 
recently outlined how implicit knowledge of social relationships can simplify the 
process of reciprocity by reducing these multiple currencies of help into a single 
trackable currency of relationship quality (de Waal, 2000; Jaeggi et al., 2012; Massen, 
Sterck, & de Vos 2010; Schino & Aureli, 2009, 2010a,b; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). For example, chimpanzees of both sexes appear to 
exchange several different commodities, including grooming, sex, support, and food, 
resulting in balanced long-term relationships (Gomes & Boesch, 2011). As Seyfarth 
& Cheney (2012) explained, “grooming on Tuesday can create an emotional bond 
that causes meat sharing on Saturday afternoon” (p. 167).   
 Similar to humans, nonhuman primates cooperate in a more contingent 
manner with less bonded partners (de Waal, 1997; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984, 2012). 
Most experimental evidence for short-term contingencies comes from cooperation 
outside of social bonds (see below), which is consistent with the expected difficulty 
of altering a long-term social bond in a short window of time (Brosnan et al., 2009; 
Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2008). When Melis et al. (2008) found no clear evidence 
of contingency in two reciprocity experiments with captive chimpanzees, pre-existing 
social bonds may have been a confounding factor, because one particular chimp 




partner control should either use previously unfamiliar subjects or somehow account 
for the history of past interaction. This is especially important in the absence of 
partner choice, discussed below.  
Contingency through partner choice.  
 Although some authors consider partner choice as a specific mechanism for 
reciprocity (Schino & Aureli, 2009, 2010a,b), reciprocity is typically equated with 
partner control (increasing and decreasing investment in a single partner) as opposed 
to partner choice (Noë & Hammerstein, 2001). However, Trivers (1971) recognized 
partner choice as a form of reciprocity stating that individuals could reciprocate by 
“decreasing to a minimum the possible exchanges between himself and a subtle 
cheater and replacing these with exchanges between a new partner or partners. In 
short, he can switch friends” (p. 47).  
 Partner choice is particularly relevant when some individuals have greater 
access to resources or a greater ability to provide services, increasing their value as 
social partners. In a particularly persuasive demonstration, Fruteau et al. (2009) 
manipulated the value of low-ranking wild vervet monkeys and observed the response 
of social partners. A single low-ranking female was given the ability to open a food 
cache for her entire social group, which led to an immediate spike in her grooming 
ratio (grooming received minus given). When a second low-ranking female was 
chosen to be an additional food provider, her grooming ratio spiked as well, and the 
first provider’s grooming ratio decreased by roughly half (Fruteau et al., 2009).  
 Sabbatini et al. (2012) conducted tests of passive food sharing (tolerated theft) 




allowed). In dyadic tests, food shared from A to B predicted food shared from B to A. 
In triadic tests, the within-dyad contingency was weaker and food sharing was 
predicted best by relationship quality, indicating that prior social bonds are more 
important than recent past sharing within a dyad. When cooperatively nursing female 
mice are allowed to choose preferred partners rather than non-preferred partners, they 
achieve higher direct fitness and more egalitarian reproductive outcomes (Koenig, 
1994, 2006; Weidt et al., 2008, 2014).  
Experimental evidence for short-term contingency.  
 Short-term contingency and partner choice are not alternatives; many 
reciprocity experiments testing short-term contingency use a partner choice design. 
Rutte and Taborsky (2008) trained rats to pull a lever to deliver food to conspecifics, 
and found that rats were more likely to pull for partners that previously pulled for 
them. Anonymous help increased pulling by 20% and help from the same partner 
increased it an additional 51% (Rutte & Taborsky 2008).  
 Under natural conditions, short-term contingency should be most obvious in 
scenarios where partner choice is reduced or absent. Examples include male 
songbirds on neighboring territories (discussed below under “temporary fitness cost 
paradox”) or mated pairs raising offspring together. Great Tit parents were found to 
feed nestlings in a balanced alternating pattern unexplainable by foraging or begging 
times. Each parent increased feeding rates after their partners contributed, but reduced 





 Experimental evidence of reciprocity comes from mobbing behavior of birds. 
Krams et al. (2008) used fake owls to induce cooperative mobbing in 44 triads of pied 
flycatcher mated pairs, with each triad consisting of three equidistant nestboxes (A, 
B, and C). Pair A was exposed to a fake owl near their nestbox to induce mobbing, 
pair B was held captive and prevented from mobbing, and pair C was left untreated, 
such that pair C always helped pair A with mobbing, but pair B could not. The 
authors then simultaneously presented pairs B and C with owls, and tested at which 
nestbox pair A would choose to help. In 30 of 32 trials, pair A helped pair C. In a 
follow-up experiment, pair B was presented with an owl. In 8 of 9 trials, pair C, but 
not pair A, joined B in mobbing, as expected if mobbing efforts are reciprocated in a 
contingent manner. 
 Like most claims of reciprocity, this conclusion has been strongly disputed. 
Russell and Wright (2009) implied that reciprocity was too cognitively difficult for 
this species (the calculated reciprocity error), and did not consider the form of helping 
to be costly (see ‘the temporary fitness cost paradox’ below and Wheatcroft & Krams, 
2009). Connor (2010) suggested that pair A did not help pair B in order to avoid a 
potential parasite infestation. These alternative hypothesis seem to assume that 
reciprocity is highly unlikely a priori. 
 Krama et al. (2012) ruled out the possibility that reciprocal mobbing at 
nestboxes was purely a byproduct benefit by showing that the degree of contingency 
was dependent on the costs and benefits. In the original study, nestboxes were 48-54 
m apart. At closer distances (20-24 m apart), they found that subjects always helped 




original finding was again replicated: pairs helped neighboring pairs contingent on 
prior help. When the predator was nearby and benefits of mobbing were very high, it 
was always worth mobbing and any benefit to others was incidental and not enforced. 
When the predator was farther away, the mobbing was more of a cooperative 
investment enforced by reciprocity. Hence, reciprocity can involve both byproduct 
benefits and enforced benefits with their relative importance determined by 
circumstances. 
 The degree of reciprocity was also sensitive to whether the failure of partners 
to mob was caused by their absence (“the excuse principle” Krams et al., 2013). To 
simulate voluntary defection, the experimenters removed pair B, but played pair B 
alarm calls to simulate their presence. To simulate involuntary absence, the 
experimenters completely removed pair B during the predator presentation. When 
pair B birds appeared present but unwilling to join, pair A only helped pair B in only 
2 of 20 cases, but when pair B was completely absent, pair A helped the mob in 20 of 
21 cases. 
 
The Temporary Fitness Cost Paradox 
 Clutton-Brock (2009) argued that no putative case of reciprocity has 
demonstrated that “assistance has a net fitness cost at the time it is provided” (p. 54). 
This is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, demonstration given that opportunity 
costs, energetic costs, and increased mortality risk (e.g., predator inspection by small 
fish: Milinski, Lüthi, Eggler, & Parker, 1997; food sharing in vampire bats: 




Pusey & Packer, 1997). This temporary fitness costs paradox stems from the fact that 
many authors including Trivers (1971) define altruism based on short-term payoffs 
rather than lifetime fitness costs. Although this definition is closer to popular usage, it 
has led to much confusion in the social evolution literature (West et al., 2007b).  
 The temporary fitness cost paradox is equivalent to saying that reciprocity 
assumes that helping others poses a risk, the possibility of cheating, even though the 
consequence of reciprocity is to prevent cheating. In other words, demonstrating 
reciprocity requires showing that it doesn’t perform its function. This paradox is 
rooted in a deeper problem regarding the notion of byproducts and inevitable returns 
(see ‘the byproduct ambiguity’ below). 
 One point of the temporary cost requirement is to exclude behaviors that are 
not forms of helping. For example, several authors have viewed mutual restraint 
among neighboring male songbirds as reciprocity (Akçay et al., 2009; Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Getty, 1987; Godard, 1993; Hyman, 2002). As male songbirds on 
neighboring territories become familiar they tend to reduce territorial defense and 
vocal aggression towards one another as compared to strangers (‘the Dear Enemy 
effect’). Playback studies simulating territorial intrusions by neighboring males found 
that male hooded warblers increased vocal aggression after playback of those same 
neighbors compared to control playbacks of other males (Godard, 1993). In similar 
playback tests, male song sparrows increased their vocal retaliation to previously 
intruding neighbors but not to others (Akçay et al., 2009). Male red-winged 




aggressive to neighbors than to strangers, but they did appear to contingently retaliate 
against neighbors based on their past actions (Olendorf, Getty, & Scribner, 2004).  
 Is it fair to call this contingent restraint ‘reciprocity’? Some argue that 
restraint is not ‘costly’ enough (e.g., Koenig, 1988), but such distinctions are 
semantic. Fitness costs and benefits are always relative to possible options. When an 
animal allows only some individuals to use a burrow, feed at a carcass, or take food 
from its hand, this can be seen equivalently as either conditional punishment or 
reward. Arguments about whether the Dear Enemy effect should ‘count’ as 
reciprocity just detract from more important points, for instance, that enforcement of 
mutual benefit by short-term contingency differs by species, does not require 
sophisticated cognition, and might be more clear when partner choice is limited by 
natural circumstances. 
 
The Byproduct Ambiguity 
 
 Reciprocity involves mutual enforcement though cooperative investments 
contingent on cooperative returns. By contrast, ‘pseudoreciprocity’ does not require 
enforcement because cooperative investments simply enable inevitable byproduct 
returns (Bergmüller, Johnstone, Russell, & Bshary, 2007; Bshary, 2010; Connor, 
1995a, 2010). Pseudoreciprocity assumes that the returns are self-serving byproducts 
and hence bestowed automatically. Whereas reciprocity involves symmetrical 
investments, pseudoreciprocity is inherently asymmetrical because it assumes that 




have been posed as more plausible alternative explanations for almost all putative 
cases of reciprocity (e.g., Bshary, 2010; Connor, 2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2011). 
Despite the purportedly clear theoretical distinctions, it is often unclear both how to 
classify real cases, and why it would be useful to do so. As an illustration, consider 
one of the most contested claims of reciprocity - predator inspection in fish. 
Predator inspection in fish: A case study of byproduct ambiguity.  
 Pairs of fish sometimes approach and inspect larger predatory fish, 
presumably to assess the situation while maintaining the safety of a companion. The 
reciprocity explanation claims that fish enforce partner cooperation by approaching 
closer only if the partner swims beside them (Milinski, 1987). Evidence suggests that 
predator approach behavior is riskier for both single fish (Pitcher, Green, & 
Magurran, 1986) and leading fish (Milinski et al., 1997). Predator inspection involves 
partner recognition and is contingent on a partner’s past and present predator 
inspection behavior (Dugatkin, 1988, 1997; Dugatkin & Alfieri, 1991; Milinski, 
1987; Milinski, David, & Kettler, 1990), and is more likely to occur with particular 
partners that have histories of other past social interactions (Croft et al., 2006). 
Differences in predator inspection behavior of fish from habitats with either high or 
low predation suggest that the behavior has been shaped by natural selection 
(Dugatkin & Alfieri, 1992).  
 Like the similar mobbing behavior in pied flycatchers, this claim of 
reciprocity has attracted much criticism. One alternative byproduct model argued that 
the “two individuals jointly adopt the same actions they would perform if alone” 




movements result even in the absence of a predator (Masters & Waite, 1990; 
Stephens et al., 1997). Therefore, the supposed cooperation actually resulted from 
“the simple statistical combination of individual orientation to a predator and 
attraction to a companion” (Stephens et al., 1997, p. 129). However, other studies 
using different species present contradicting evidence that inspection is indeed 
contingent on the existence of a predator (Dugatkin, 1991). Moreover, the observation 
that fish have preferred inspection partners (Croft et al., 2006; Dugatkin & Alfieri, 
1991; Dugatkin, 1997, Milinski et al., 1990) cannot be reconciled with a simple 
model that assumes no social interactions. 
 A more nuanced byproduct explanation assumed preference for previously 
bold individuals, consistent partner choice, and the idea that fish remembering a 
specific partner “could ‘trust’ it to be bold during subsequent interactions” (Connor, 
1996, p. 453). The difference between partner choice for fish that are ‘bold’ versus 
‘cooperative’ is admittedly semantic (Connor 1996), and the distinction between this 
byproduct and reciprocity model is based not on the decisions of the fish but on 
different interpretations of the costs and benefits. For example, the payoff matrix for 
leading and lagging behind might not match a Prisoner’s Dilemma but rather a Hawk-
Dove Game (also called Snowdrift or Chicken Game), such that bold leaders (dove) 
do better with other bold leaders but it will still pay to boldly lead with a parasitic 
laggard (hawk) because two laggards do worst of all (Noë, 2006). According to 
Connor (1996) and Stephens et al. (1997), this would mean the behavior is not 
reciprocity. As Stephens et al. (1997) summarized, “the only unambiguous way to 




measurement of the economics (i.e. the payoff matrices).” The assumption is that, to 
understand the behavior, it must be classified as a strategy in a particular game. 
 The problem is that predator inspection actually looks less like any particular 
game the more one examines it (Noë, 2006). Fish are not choosing between binary 
options, such as leading or lagging; rather, they can approach to varying distances at 
varying speeds. Depending on information about the partner, the actor, and the 
circumstances, the costs and benefits of leading or lagging can be adjusted 
continuously by leading ahead a bit less (‘parceling’ Connor, 1995b) or a bit more 
(‘raising the stakes’ Roberts & Sherratt, 1998). For example, the contingency of 
mobbing decisions by pied flycatchers varies with predator distance, because the 
perceived payoffs change with perceived risks (Krama et al., 2012). Views on how 
well biological reality matches a particular game depend on how literally one takes 
the game assumptions, how one divides the cooperative behavior into rounds, and 
how one assigns behavior to the binary choices. For these reasons, debates regarding 
how well various natural behaviors match the Prisoner’s Dilemma are typically not 
resolved by additional empirical evidence (Clements & Stephens, 1995; Doebeli & 
Hauert, 2005; Dugatkin, 1997; Milinski et al., 1997; Noë, 2006; Pusey & Packer, 
1997; Raihani & Bshary, 2011; Stephens et al., 1997).  
Game payoffs and the byproduct ambiguity.  
 Game theory payoff structures and their outcome in evolutionary simulations 
are drastically altered when allowing any additional element of realism such as 
kinship, spatial structure, partner switching, communication, long-term relationships, 




(Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Noë, 2006). Payoffs for partners in the real world might 
also be asymmetric, so each individual or type of individual would in effect be 
playing a different game. Consider a scenario where some lions can lead the rush to 
protect a territory from intruders or lag behind and get the benefits of defense without 
paying the costs (Connor, 2010; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Heinsohn & Packer, 1995). 
Territory defense might be a Hawk-Dove Game for male lions because they can lose 
all their offspring if ousted by a foreign male (leading alone > mutual defection). 
Whereas for female lions the same scenario might be closer to a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(mutual defection > leading alone) because they are likely to sacrifice some, but not 
all, of their reproductive success if the foreign male gains control. In this case, are 
male lions performing pseudoreciprocity, while female lions are performing 
reciprocity? 
 Strategic adaptive behaviors are always reducible to a combination of very 
simple decision rules, which are themselves byproducts of other adaptations. So if 
joint predator inspection in fish is shown to be merely based on a foundation of 
simple byproduct behaviors, this demonstration of how the contingency works does 
not refute the idea that decisions of fish are enforced by that contingency. The fact 
that fish benefit from preferentially choosing bold leaders as partners is already 
enough contingent aid to help enforce cooperation. Partner choice already assumes 
that fish are keeping track of their partners’ actions and identity, so why would they 
not use this information to also guide their actions within dyads?  
 Byproduct explanations are not favored because they are empirically verified; 




known to exist, rather than make new predictions of what animals should do to 
maximize fitness. For example, in a review arguing for the absence of evidence for 
reciprocity, Clutton-Brock (2009) suggested that simple byproducts or 
pseudoreciprocity could explain elements of mutualism or manipulation such as: 
 
 Regularly associating with dominant individuals, and grooming them repeatedly [in 
order to] habituate them [and gain] shelter from competition” as well as the 
“establishment and maintenance of long-term mutualistic relationships…[in which] 
individuals compete to establish relationships with potential protectors, allies or 
mates, using a wide range of different forms of affiliative behavior, including close 
association, grooming, support in competitive interactions, reassurance, and 
consolation. (p. 55). 
 
   In all these cases, the individuals are not reciprocating; rather they merely 
“modify their behavior to take advantage of the fixed responses of conspecifics.” But 
if such relationships are completely explained by simple byproduct benefits and do 
not require enforcement, why then do such complex, long-term social relationships 
correlate with brain size (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007, 2010)? 
 In many cases, classifying cases as reciprocity or pseudoreciprocity is more 
clearly semantic. Reciprocal egg-trading by hermaphroditic fish involves the 
alternated exchange of valuable eggs for fertilization by the partner (Fischer, 1984; 
Sella, 1985). The reciprocity explanation has been contested using an alternative 




represents a costly investment leading to a costly return and that individuals “parcel 
those benefits to manipulate each other’s optimal strategy” while also arguing that, 
“in reciprocity, an individual would realize short-term benefits by cheating on any 
given interaction. This is not the case in the model presented here” (p. 523). Again, 
this is a semantic distinction, which depends on how one divides behavior into 
‘interactions’. A crucial question is whether the reciprocity hypothesis can ever 
produce testable predictions that cannot be later explained as consistent with a 
byproduct explanation. 
 Byproduct benefits and enforced benefits are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
most enforced benefits likely originated as byproduct benefits, because the frequency 
of cheating can fluctuate in a population such that a given benefit might be considered 
‘a fixed response’ or not, depending on the phenotypes currently in the population. 
When a cooperative trait goes to fixation, this eliminates the selective pressure for 
enforcement mechanisms such as contingency. Eventually the trait can become 
unconditional and hence susceptible again to cheating, which can easily arise again 
from new variation in the cooperative trait (Foster & Kokko, 2006; Imhof, 
Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2005).  
 The line between different kinds of byproduct mutualism and 
pseudoreciprocity can also be subjective. Raihini & Bshary (2011) explain that seed 
dispersal is either byproduct mutualism or pseudoreciprocity depending on which 





The plant invests resources into making seeds that are attractive to some animals. 
This enables a self-serving response from the animal that eats the seed and later 
disperses it via defecation. Because the plant makes an initial investment in the 
interaction, but there is no potential to benefit from reducing this investment, we can 
explain the plant’s investment with the concept of positive pseudo-reciprocity. The 
animal, on the other hand, simply eats the seed and later defecates: there is no 
investment and the benefits to the plant are a by-product of the animal’s own self-
serving behavior. (p. 1635) 
  
 The authors assume that there is no potential benefit for a plant to reduce its 
investment, but this is only because the fitness of a plant that produces poor fruits 
would be reduced by partner choice. If a particular fruit tree provides poor fruit, 
animal foragers stay away. This is because animals make a costly investment in 
selecting fruits to open, eat, or carry away. From the plant’s perspective, the 
cooperative returns (seed dispersal) are thus not fixed, but depend on the size of the 
investment (fruit quantity and quality). From the animal’s perspective, the 
cooperative returns (fruit quality) might depend on the cooperative investment 
(choosing to move to one fruit tree over another). Here, we see that the line between 
byproducts and enforced benefits is blurred further.  
 
Defining Reciprocity 
 Evolutionary explanations of cooperation are drawn from several academic 




al., 2007b). The semantic framework one chooses ultimately depends on what is most 
useful. But for authors discussing reciprocity, it will be particularly important to 
define their terms, because reciprocity has many different contradictory meanings in 
the literature. In this review, I defined reciprocity as occurring when individuals make 
contingent cooperative investments based on past or expected returns. I believe that 
this simple, testable definition best captures the original broad concept described by 
Trivers (1971) and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). Under this definition, reciprocity is 
a broad overarching term for conditional enforcement of direct fitness cooperation, 
including sanctions (Denison, 2000; Kiers et al., 2003; West, Kiers, Simms, & 
Denison, 2002), reciprocal rewards (Kiers et al., 2011), partner control, and partner 
choice (Foster & Wenseleers, 2006; Noë & Hammerstein, 2001).  
 
Conclusion 
 Three key theoretical frameworks have guided empirical studies of 
cooperation. Inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964) solved the puzzle of altruism. 
Reciprocity theory (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971) illustrated the roles of 
contingency and frequency-dependent selection in cooperation. Biological market 
theory (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994) clarified the importance of partner choice and 
asymmetries in exchange rates. Unfortunately, several unnecessary controversies 
have resulted from incompatible modeling approaches and semantic frameworks that 
actually make the same predictions in the real world. One example is the social 
evolution debate regarding inclusive fitness and multi-level selection (or ‘kin 




reciprocity involves a number of competing semantic frameworks. These semantic 
differences can lead to disagreements about facts, when for example authors 
mistakenly believe that behaviors described as reciprocity (in a broad sense) are 
unlikely to be real or important, because reciprocity (in a narrow sense) is rare. Rather 
than subjectively fitting behaviors to a game metaphor, a broader notion of 
reciprocity allows researchers to focus on testing the relative importance of different 
social and ecological factors that influence helping behavior. Hopefully, this review 
will help distinguish real alternative hypotheses from semantic disagreements based 
on modeling preferences (“all models are wrong, but some are useful,” Box & 
Draper, 1987, p. 424). 
 Cooperative traits cannot always be clearly classified as byproducts versus 
enforced, direct fitness versus indirect fitness, or altruistic versus mutualistic. Many 
cooperative behaviors, especially those in complex animal societies, are supported not 
by a singular mechanism, but rather by a complex interacting set of decision rules that 
take into account multiple factors such as genetic relatedness, partner choice, short-
term returns, and long-term prior relationships (e.g., cooperative breeding in cichlids: 
Zöttl, Heg, Chervet, & Taborsky, 2013; food sharing in primates: Jaeggi & Gurven, 
2013; Silk, Brosnan, Henrich, Lambeth, & Shapiro, 2013; food sharing in vampire 
bats: Carter & Wilkinson, 2013a).  
 How then should we classify various mechanisms (and should we even try 
to)? One proposal is to avoid the term reciprocity and simply refer to ‘cooperative 
investments’ and ‘cooperative returns’ (Noë 2006). However, simply abandoning the 




recent findings and older studies. In fact, using the terms ‘investment’ and ‘return' 
already assumes much of what reciprocity predicts— that helping another individual 
is a conditional investment leading to a return that is not fixed. Whatever this 
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Chapter 2: Food sharing in vampire bats: reciprocal help 
predicts donations more than relatedness or harassment 
 
Abstract 
Common vampire bats often regurgitate food to roost-mates that fail to feed. The 
original explanation for this costly helping behaviour invoked both direct and indirect 
fitness benefits. Several authors have since suggested that food sharing is maintained 
solely by indirect fitness because non-kin food sharing could have resulted from kin 
recognition errors, indiscriminate altruism within groups, or harassment. To test these 
alternatives, we examined predictors of food-sharing decisions under controlled 
conditions of mixed relatedness and equal familiarity. Over a 2-year period, we 
individually fasted 20 vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) and induced food sharing 
on 48 days. Surprisingly, donors initiated food sharing more often than recipients, 
which is inconsistent with harassment. Food received was the best predictor of food 
given, and 8.5 times more important than relatedness. Sixty-four percent of dyads 
were unrelated, approaching the 67% expected if nepotism was absent. Consistent 
with social bonding, the food-sharing network was consistent and correlated with 
mutual allogrooming. Together with past work, these findings support the hypothesis 
that food sharing in vampire bats provides mutual direct fitness benefits, and is not 





Cooperation poses an evolutionary puzzle whenever a donor pays a cost to 
help a recipient: what prevents recipients from receiving the reproductive benefits of 
donor cooperation without paying the costs? Several mechanisms can prevent such 
‘cheating’ thereby ensuring that cooperative investments yield net inclusive fitness 
benefits (West et al. 2007a). The exploitation of altruism is often prevented through 
kin discrimination (Griffin & West 2003) or policing (Ratnieks & Wenseleers 2008), 
whereas direct fitness cooperation can be enforced by behaviours that reward helpers, 
punish cheats, or both (Noë & Hammerstein 1994; Kiers et al. 2003, 2011; West et al. 
2007a; Jander & Herre 2010, Fruteau et al. 2011). To identify what mechanisms 
enforce or maintain cooperation, controlled experiments can directly test how 
individuals respond to cheating. The most successful of such experiments involve 
organisms that are easy to manipulate in the lab (e.g. Grutter & Bshary 2003; Kiers et 
al. 2003, 2011; Bshary & Grutter 2005, 2006; Diggle et al. 2007). Studies using more 
cognitively complex organisms, like nonhuman primates, are often limited to learned 
behaviours, such as pulling levers to deliver food to others (e.g. Noë 2006, de Waal & 
Brosnan 2006, Rutte & Taborsky 2008), because inducing or manipulating natural 
helping acts that occur in the wild is difficult or impossible. 
Common vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) feed only on blood and die after 
70 hours of fasting (McNab 1973), but unfed bats often receive food from roost-mates 
by regurgitation (Wilkinson 1984). Vampire bat food sharing is potentially a powerful 
model for understanding the cognitive enforcement of cooperation, because this 




and can be induced experimentally. Previous work found that free-ranging female 
vampire bats regurgitated blood mostly to their offspring (77 of 110 donations), but 
also fed adult females, preferentially close relatives and only frequent roost-mates 
(i.e. >60% co-roosting association; Wilkinson 1984). Hence, adult donations were 
predicted independently by relatedness and association. A captive experiment that 
induced food sharing among unrelated bats found that bats returned food donations to 
their past donors on 4 of 6 possible occasions— more than expected by chance 
(Wilkinson 1984). Although vampire bat food sharing has been a textbook example 
of reciprocity, this interpretation has been questioned due to several alternative 
explanations (e.g. Hammerstein 2003, Foster 2004, Stevens et al. 2005, Clutton-
Brock 2009, Davies et al. 2012). 
Wilkinson (1984, 1988) originally suggested that food donating vampire bats 
obtain both direct and indirect fitness benefits, with direct benefits outweighing kin-
selected benefits. Under this scenario, cheating is prevented because bats donate 
preferentially to past donors and relatives. Hence, food-sharing decisions should 
integrate cues to kinship and future direct benefits (e.g. reciprocal donations or 
allogrooming, Wilkinson 1986). 
Others have suggested that non-kin food sharing might simply result from 
manipulation (e.g. Clutton-Brock 2009). According to this “harassment hypothesis”, 
non-kin food sharing benefits only recipients, not donors. Persistent begging by unfed 
bats might coerce conspecifics into food sharing. If so, donations should be solicited 




Alternatively, donations to non-kin could simply be an incidental by-product 
of kin altruism. Hammerstein (2003) suggested that olfactory kin recognition cues 
could have been miscalibrated by the lack of kin present in the captive experiment 
(see also Stevens et al. 2005). This “miscalibrated kin recognition hypothesis” 
predicts that donors should donate almost exclusively to kin when in the more natural 
context of mixed relatedness.  
Selection can favour indiscriminate altruism within social groups when the 
average within-group relatedness is high enough and the cost of helping is low 
enough. The “group-level altruism hypothesis” predicts that donors indiscriminately 
help groupmates (Foster 2004, Paolucci et al. 2006, Witkowski 2007). For example, 
Foster’s (2004) model of vampire bat food sharing “assumes that fed bats do not 
discriminate among unfed bats when giving blood” presumably because the costs of 
discriminating kin are too high. 
Several simulations have been developed to explain food sharing (Foster 
2004, Wilkinson 1988, Paolucci et al. 2006, Witkowski 2007), yet no one has 
gathered additional empirical evidence regarding how vampire bats decide to share 
food (but see DeNault & McFarlane 1995, Voigt et al. 2012). As a first step, we 
tested predictions of the above hypotheses by experimentally simulating unsuccessful 
foraging attempts in a captive colony of common vampire bats of mixed relatedness 
and equal familiarity. The original study (Wilkinson 1984) compared the explanatory 
roles of relatedness and association. Here, we directly compare relatedness and 
reciprocal help as predictors of food sharing, under conditions of equal association. 




size (as predicted by harassment) and food received from any groupmate (as predicted 




All procedures were approved by the University of Maryland Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee (Protocol R-10-63). We did not test unhealthy bats, 
late pregnancy females, or mothers and their juveniles <4 months of age. We stopped 
testing males partway through the experiment since removing males coincided with 
increased aggression in the colony.  
We fasted 11 males and 9 females out of 25 common vampire bats, descended 
from multiple matrilines. Bats were housed at the Organization for Bat Conservation 
(Bloomfield Hills, MI, USA) in a flight cage large enough to allow them to freely 
associate during the study and for >2 years prior. All bats were uniquely marked with 
passive integrated transponder (PIT) tags and coloured bands, except for three 
juveniles (4-8 months) born during the study that were reliably identified by PIT tags 
and distinctive face and body marks.  
Fasting Procedure 
To induce food sharing we removed and fasted a subject from the group for 24 
h, then returned it to the cage with fed groupmates, and recorded subsequent social 
interactions for 2 h with a Sony Nightshot digital camcorder and infrared 




after the 2 h observation period. We selected available bats randomly and without 
replacement to serve as subjects, and tested each subject 1-5 times. After the 
observation period, fasted bats were provided food.  
Behavioural data 
We refer to subjects that received food as ‘recipients’ and partners that 
provided food as ‘donors’. To quantify food sharing, we measured mouth-licking 
bouts via frame-by-frame analysis in iMOVIE 11.  We defined mouth-licking bouts 
as periods where food could be passed that lasted at least 5 s and were separated by 
>5 s. We noted whether one bat clearly began licking a conspecific’s mouth and 
classified bouts accordingly as initiated by the recipient, donor, or ‘unknown’. We 
defined allogrooming as the licking of a conspecific at locations other than the mouth. 
To measure mean pairwise allogrooming rates, we randomly selected individuals for 
focal sample observations 1-4 times during non-trial days and counted the presence 
and direction of allogrooming with any conspecific every minute for 60 minutes. 
We used mouth-licking time to estimate amount of food sharing because it 
strongly correlated with mass gain during the 2 h trial (r=0.90; 95% C.I.=0.73 – 0.96). 
We pooled time spent donating food from multiple days to obtain a single measure of 
food sharing for each directional dyad that had an opportunity to share food in each 
direction (n=312 dyads), except when we analyzed sequences of sharing events (see 





We extracted DNA from 2-3 mm biopsy punches using Qiagen DNeasy kits, 
then amplified and genotyped 13 microsatellite loci to estimate maximum likelihood 
coefficients of relatedness (r) for each dyad using ML-RELATE (Kalinowski et al. 
2006, see Appendix 2). We jackknifed across loci to estimate standard errors (SE) for 
each r value (SE range=0-0.035; SE mean=0.005). Across all dyads, r=0 for 59%, 
r<0.05 for 69%, and r>0.25 for 20%. Patterns of observed and expected 
heterozygosity indicated no history of inbreeding (Appendix 2).  
Statistical analysis 
The variance in mouth-licking times increased with the mean, so we log-
transformed mean food sharing time for each dyad (Appendix 2, Figure S1).  We 
therefore defined “food donated” from bat A to B as ln ([total food shared A to B / 
chances for A to feed B]+1). We defined “food received” similarly, except with the 
roles of A and B reversed. We z-transformed all variables to standardize scales.  
 To analyse dyadic data we used a randomisation approach to general linear 
models, where we permuted food donated to sets of predictor variables creating a null 
distribution of comparison F values (Manly 2007). We first conducted univariate 
analyses to identify variables that predicted mean food donated across dyads, then 
performed a permuted multiple regression using the lmp function in the R package 
lmPerm. To choose the best model, we selected predictors and their interactions based 
on backward stepwise regression using Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria in 
JMP 10. We interpreted interactions by examining correlations between two variables 




predictors, we averaged the sequential sum of squares over all orderings (Kruskal 
1987) for up to three predictors using the R package relaimpo (Grömping 2006). We 
predicted amounts of food donated across directed dyads that could have shared food 
in both directions. We also predicted the presence or absence of food sharing across 
these dyads using logistic regression, and finally the amount of food donated only 
within dyads that did share food. 
To determine if individual food donations were exchanged in a reciprocal 
manner over time (de Waal 1997), we examined the sequence of sharing events 
across trials to test for correlations between food given and received within dyads 
(using both amounts and proportions, see Appendix 2). To test the effect of general 
help received, we compared the mean amount of food donated by a bat to all fasted 
partners before and after it was fed by others to determine if it donated larger amounts 
after receiving food from others.  
To test for symmetry and consistency of relationships, we used Mantel and 
randomisation tests to compare network similarity for (1) food sharing in subsequent 
fasting rounds, (2) food sharing six months apart, (3) allogrooming given and 
received, and (4) food sharing given and received, using only bats that both served as 
subjects and were available as donors in every round (Appendix 2). 
Finally, to assess the harassment hypothesis, we examined whether recipients 
or donors were more likely to initiate mouth-licking. We also tested two potential 
measures of coercion ability, recipient age and size (forearm length), as potential 






Pattern of food sharing  
We induced food sharing on 48 out of 52 fasting trials over 780 days, and 
recorded 950 food-sharing bouts. Food sharing occurred primarily between females 
and never between adult males (Figure S2, Appendix 2). Sixty-three of the 98 dyads 
that shared food had relatedness estimates <0.05. This percentage (64%) approaches 
that percentage expected (67%) if partners were chosen at random with respect to 
relatedness (i.e. 208 of 312 possible food-sharing dyads were related by <0.05).  
In each trial, recipients were fed by an average of 3.9 donors (range=1-7). 
Median donation time per dyad in a trial was 191 s (N=204 donations, mean=339 s, 
range=5-3315 s). The total amount of food received from all donors during the 2 h 
period was typically about 5% of an adult recipient’s mass, which restored ~20% of 
mass lost during 24 h of fasting (Appendix 2).  
Predictors of food sharing across dyads 
 Univariate analyses showed that food donated was predicted by food received, 
allogrooming received, pairwise relatedness (Figure 1), and donor sex (included as a 
binary variable, Figure S4 in Appendix 2). All correlations were also significant 
before log transformations (p<0.0002 in all cases). 
 The best multivariate model (adjusted R2=0.372, F(5,306)=37.8, p<0.0002) 
included food received (β=0.319, p<0.0002), donor sex (β=0.267, p<0.0002), 
allogrooming received (β=0.186, p<0.0002), and the interaction between relatedness 




interaction plot showed that the relationship between food donated and received 
increased in slope with higher relatedness. Food received was 8.5 times more 
important than relatedness for predicting food donated (Figure 2).  
 Food received, donor sex, and allogrooming received, but not relatedness, also 
predicted the presence of food sharing (Appendix 2). Among the 98 food sharing 
dyads, donation size was predicted independently by food received and relatedness, 
with the latter relationship driven by mother-offspring pairs (Appendix 2). 
Predictors of food sharing across trials 
Sequential analysis across trial days indicated that the amount of food donated 
and previously received were correlated when comparing the proportion of a donor’s 
contribution to the total food received by a partner (R2=0.08, F(1,160)=13.9,  
p<0.0002), but not when comparing the absolute amount of food given and received 
(R2=0.01, F(1,160)=2.4,  p=0.1). 
We found no evidence that being fed in general increased subsequent food 
sharing, as expected by generalised reciprocity (Appendix 2). Donation sizes could 
sometimes be compared both before and after the donor was fed within a round of 
trials. In these 28 cases, we failed to find a difference in presence of food sharing 
(paired t=0.98, df=27, p=0.34), total food donated (paired t=-1.3, df=27, p=0.20), or 
food donated per recipient (paired t=0.16, df=27, p=0.87). When the donor was fed 
on the previous day, we found no difference between the amount donated on that day 
compared to the donor’s average on other days (n=9 donors and 9 trials, paired t=-




Consistency of social relationships  
Dyadic relationships were consistent and symmetrical over time. Contrary to 
random association, food-sharing networks were significantly similar when 
comparing patterns 8 days apart (15 bats, amount shared: p=0.0298, presence of 
sharing: p=0.0072) or 6 months apart (67 dyads, amount shared: p=0.0238, presence 
of sharing: p<0.0002). Amounts given and received were correlated for both the food-
sharing (15 bats, amount shared: p=0.0004) and allogrooming network (Figure 3). 
Predictors of harassment 
Donors initiated food sharing in 62% of non-maternal food sharing bouts. 
Mean duration did not differ between food sharing bouts initiated by donors versus 
recipients (t=1.4, n=235, p=0.16). We found no effect of recipient age (R2=0.006, 
p=0.2) or forearm length (R2=0.004, p=0.5) on amount of food donated.  
 
Discussion 
Predictors of food sharing 
 The relative importance of relatedness and reciprocal sharing in determining 
the food-sharing decisions of adult vampire bats was not directly comparable in 
previous work (Wilkinson 1984). Here, we found that, among captive vampire bats 
where co-roosting association is held constant, the predictive role of reciprocal help 
greatly exceeds that of relatedness. Food received from a partner was the strongest 




partner. The donor’s sex, amount of allogrooming received, and a positive interaction 
between food received and relatedness predicted food donated to a lesser extent.  
Distinguishing the roles of direct and indirect fitness can be difficult because 
social behaviours, such as punishment or reciprocal help, can change the cost-benefit 
ratio in Hamilton’s rule (r>c/b), leading to complex interactions between direct and 
indirect fitness benefits (Wilkinson 1988, Griffin & West 2003, West et al. 2007a, 
Ratnieks & Wenseleers 2008, Zöttl et al. 2013). For example, the predictive roles of 
reciprocal help and relatedness in food sharing could interact positively or negatively. 
Since vampire bats under the age of 2 years fail to feed on 30% of nights (Wilkinson 
1984), the benefits of receiving food are likely age-dependent. We might therefore 
expect older bats to feed related young but not vice versa causing a negative 
relationship between the predictors, reciprocal help and relatedness. Instead, we 
found a positive interaction: highly related pairs engaged in reciprocal sharing that 
was more symmetrical than unrelated pairs. For example, the largest donations were 
four females feeding their juvenile (4 and 8 months) or subadult male offspring (19 
and 31 months); in all cases, the offspring reciprocated with large donations to the 
unfed mothers.  
Evidence for social bonds 
Much emerging evidence links social bonds with direct fitness benefits in 
social mammals [e.g. Schülke et al. 2010 and references therein]. Wild female 
vampire bats have been observed still roosting together after 12 years (Wilkinson 
1985), and several lines of evidence suggest that such long-term social relationships 




bonding function because it is uncorrelated with ectoparasite levels in the wild 
(Wilkinson 1986), and occurred commonly and symmetrically in the absence of 
visible ectoparasites (Figure 3). Second, dyads that share food performed more 
allogrooming on non-test days than non-sharing dyads (Figure 3). Third, food sharing 
and allogrooming were correlated across dyads (Figure 1), and food-sharing patterns 
were significantly consistent over days and months. Finally, male vampire bats rarely 
share food in the wild where their social relationships are transient (Wilkinson 1985), 
but will share food in captivity (DeNault & McFarlane 1995) where male associations 
are more stable. Taken together with the relatively weak correlation between the 
exact amounts of within-dyad food donated and received between trials, these 
findings are consistent with long-term social bonds involving mutual exchange of 
both food and grooming over long periods, rather than short-term turn-taking or 
calculated reciprocity (de Waal & Brosnan 2006).  
Alternative explanations for non-kin food sharing 
Contrary to predictions of the harassment hypothesis (Clutton-Brock 2009), 
donors were more likely than recipients to approach and initiate mouth-licking 
(Appendix 2), even when excluding mother-offspring donations. We also found no 
relationship between food sharing and recipient age or forearm size, both potential 
correlates of harassment ability. The harassment hypothesis therefore seems 
untenable as the sole explanation for non-kin food sharing. 
Can vampire bat food sharing be explained by indirect fitness alone? Contrary 
to predictions of the miscalibrated kin recognition hypothesis (Hammerstein 2003), 




and equal familiarity. In this study, relatedness did not predict the presence or amount 
of food sharing across dyads that could have shared food. Although relatedness 
predicted donation size for food-sharing dyads, the effect was largely driven by 
extended maternal care (Appendix 2). One interpretation of these negative results is 
that kin discrimination is possible, but the indirect benefits of nepotism were 
overshadowed by the direct benefits of reciprocal food sharing. Alternatively, a 
group-level altruism hypothesis might predict that ‘kin discrimination’ is based on 
familiarity rather than phenotypic matching, leading to indiscriminate altruism within 
groups (Foster 2004). 
The fission-fusion social dynamics of wild vampire bats lead to unstable 
roosting group membership, and male dispersal and occasional recruitment of 
unrelated females lead to low average relatedness in groups (r=0.02 to 0.11 based on 
genetic and pedigree analyses; Wilkinson 1985). Under such conditions, selection is 
not expected to favour kin recognition mechanisms based on familiarity alone. The 
multi-level selection model by Foster  (2004) suggests that indiscriminate altruism 
within groups can be favoured at mean group relatedness levels as low as 0.05, but 
this model assumes that bats are neither cheating, reciprocating, nor nepotistic, as any 
of these strategies would make a system of indiscriminate altruism unstable. In 
contrast, we found that the network of food donations within the captive group was 
less random, more reciprocal, and more consistent over time, than expected by 
chance.  
Free-ranging common vampire bats preferentially feed relatives within roosts 




1985) indicating that vampire bats are capable of kin discrimination. While the 
mechanisms for kin or individual discrimination are still unclear, auditory and 
olfactory cues are likely. Female bats of all species recognize juveniles through 
isolation calls, and adult common vampire bats often produced similar individual-
specific contact calls when isolated (Carter et al. 2012). Playback studies have 
demonstrated that such calls allow individual discrimination in the closest extant 
vampire bat species, Diaemus youngi (Carter et al. 2008). Food-sharing bouts were 
preceded by allogrooming and sniffing, which suggest a role for odour. Additional 
studies are needed to test recognition mechanisms in this species. 
Evidence for reciprocity  
The correlation we observed between food donated and received does not 
demonstrate that receiving food determines subsequent food donated within a dyad. 
For this reason, we avoided the term “reciprocity” to prevent confusion because the 
term has broad, narrow, and sometimes contrasting definitions in the literature (see 
Chapter 1). Reciprocity could involve partner control through direct reward or 
punishment within dyads, or partner choice and switching based on the perceived 
relative value of different partners as co-operators (e.g. Noë & Hammerstein 2003, 
Bshary & Grutter 2005, 2006; Rutte & Taborsky 2008; Fruteau et al. 2009). 
Experiments are needed to test if and how donors respond to cheating. 
We found that on average fasted bats were fed by three donors, so the costs of 
food sharing were often divided among partners. As expected, potential donors 
sometimes rejected begging recipients, but unexpectedly, some fasted subjects also 




may indicate that bats favour some food-sharing partners over others, with 
implications for modelling vampire bat cooperation as a biological market (Noë & 
Hammerstein 1994, Fruteau et al. 2009) rather than as an iterated dyadic interaction.  
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Figure 1. Relationships between food donated and predictor variables. Z-score 
for log food donated was predicted by z-scores of (a) log food received (R2=0.27, 
p<0.0002), (b) allogrooming received (R2=0.14, p<0.0002), and (c) relatedness 
(R2=0.04, p<0.0012). A bubble plot (d) shows multivariate relationships by scaling 






Figure 2. Relative importance on food donated of several predictors. Proportion 
of R2 is shown for four predictor variables. An interaction effect (see text) is not 





Figure 3. Allogrooming given correlates with allogrooming received. 
Allogrooming giving is plotted against allogrooming received for dyads that did not 
share food (a, n=214, r=0.62, p<0.0002) and dyads that did share food (b, n=98, 
r=0.81, p<0.0002). On non-trial days, dyads that shared food both gave and received 






Chapter 3: Intranasal oxytocin increases social grooming 
and food sharing in the common vampire bat Desmodus 
rotundus 
Abstract 
Intranasal oxytocin (OT) delivery has been used to non-invasively manipulate 
mammalian cooperative behavior. Such manipulations can potentially provide insight 
into both shared and species-specific mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviors. 
Vampire bats are remarkable among mammals for their high rates of allogrooming 
and the presence of regurgitated food sharing among adult females. We administered 
intranasal OT to highly familiar captive vampire bats to test for an effect on 
allogrooming and food sharing between related and unrelated adults. We found that 
intranasal OT did not have a detectable effect on the occurrence of food sharing, but it 
did increase the size of regurgitated food donations after controlling for dyad and 
amount of allogrooming. Intranasal OT in females increased the amount of 
allogrooming per partner and across all partners per trial, but not the number of 
partners. We also found that the peak effect of OT treatments occurred 30-50 minutes 
after administration, which is consistent with past data on the latency for intranasal 
OT to affect relevant brain areas in rats and mice. We suggest that measuring prior 
social relationships can help interpret the results of hormonal manipulations of 
cooperative behavior, and that intranasal OT is a potential tool for influencing dyadic 
cooperative investments, but it may be difficult to alter partner choice in vampire bats 






Social mammals make frequent decisions regarding when and how much to invest in 
cooperative behaviors. These decisions depend on an interacting suite of internal and 
external factors and often culminate in complex long-term social relationships. To 
determine the consequences of these decisions, it would be desirable to manipulate 
the size of cooperative investments from one animal to another. One promising tool 
for experimentally manipulating mammalian social behavior is the neuropeptide 
oxytocin (OT, reviewed by Crockford et al. 2014 and refs therein). Peripheral OT 
administration can experimentally increase the cooperative investments of targeted 
individuals without highly invasive procedures (e.g. Madden et al. 2011), and it 
affects a wide variety of species-specific cooperative behaviors (e.g. humans: Bartz et 
al. 2011, Veening & Olivier 2013; macaques: Simpson et al. 2014; marmosets: Smith 
et al. 2010; meerkats: Madden et al. 2011; naked mole-rats: Mooney et al. 2014; rats: 
Calcagnoli et al. 2015; dogs: Romero et al. 2014). Oxytocin manipulation thus 
provides a method for identifying mammalian social behaviors that share a common 
mechanism. 
We tested for effects of intranasal OT on food sharing and allogrooming in the 
highly social common vampire bat (Desmodus rotundus). These bats feed only on a 
single meal of blood per night, can starve in <72 hours, and often fail to obtain meals 
(with 18% of 598 bats failing to feed on a given night), but young bats and adult 
females that fail to feed often solicit regurgitations of blood from familiar 




symmetrical networks of regurgitated food sharing and allogrooming, both in the wild 
(Wilkinson 1984, 1985) and captivity (Carter & Wilkinson 2013a, 2013b). Some free-
ranging females maintain these associations for more than a decade even under 
conditions of frequent roost switching (Tschapka & Wilkinson 1999). Allogrooming 
and food sharing events are correlated across dyads and over time, with allogrooming 
often occurring immediately before sharing, suggesting that allogrooming may serve 
in facilitating social recognition, assessing the ability to give (Wilkinson 1986), 
signaling a desire to receive (i.e. begging), or signaling intention to share (Carter & 
Wilkinson 2013a). Using familiar captive vampires bats, we asked the following 
questions.  Does intranasal OT increase allogrooming and food sharing? And if so, 
does OT increase cooperative investments with established sharing and grooming 
partners, broaden investments to more partners, or promote increased investments to 
fewer partners?  
Methods 
Food sharing 
We tested if oxytocin (OT) affects food sharing in five (four female, one male) 
common vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) on 39 trial days from Sept 17, 2013 to 
Dec 16, 2013. We prepared OT treatments by mixing OT (Bachem, USA) into saline 
solution at a concentration of 0.45 µg/µl and treated bats by slowly pipetting 5 µl of 
solution at a time into each nostril of a bat with a micropipettor allowing 5-15 s 
between each intranasal dose. If bats sneezed during the treatment, we administered 




For each trial day, we first removed and fasted a subject bat while the other 
four bats were fed blood ad libitum in a 1.7 x 2.1 x 2.3 m cage for 24 h. We then 
randomly treated two fed bats with OT and two fed bats with saline, returned the 
fasted bat to the four treated fed bats in their home cage, and observed interactions for 
2 h with a Nightshot camera (Sony, USA) and infrared spotlight (IRlamp6, Wildlife 
Engineering, USA). For each min, we scored the presence (>5 s) of mouth-licking 
and allogrooming (defined as one bat licking, chewing, sniffing, or nuzzling another 
bat’s body). We measured the subject’s mass to the nearest 0.01g (model L125 digital 
scale, Escali, Burnsville, MN, USA) immediately before and after observation. We 
defined “donation size” as the total mouth-licking time between two bats in a trial that 
led to subsequent mass gain in the fasted subject.  
Subjects were not fasted again until all other bats served as subjects, but 
otherwise bats chosen for fasting or OT treatment were selected at random. In our last 
four trials one female was removed from the experiment, and we stopped our 
experiment at 39 trials due to suspected illness in the colony, which led to bats 
serving as fasted subjects an unequal number of times (31, 31, 23, 35, 32), and 
potential donors being treated with saline/OT an unequal number of times (14/17, 
15/16, 16/17, 16/14, and 14/13).  
We estimated kinship among individuals using a maternal pedigree, 30 
polymorphic microsatellite markers, and the program ML-RELATE (Kalinowski et 
al., 2007). We log-transformed both donation size and allogrooming duration so that 
neither deviated significantly from normality (Shapiro Wilk’s W=0.98 and 0.95, 




on the presence or absence of a donation across all opportunities. For all observed 
donations, we tested which factors (allogrooming, treatment, dyad, kinship, and the 
interaction between kinship and treatment) predicted donation size using minimum 
AIC and backward stepwise regression for model selection in JMP 11 (SAS 2013). 
Our best model for donation size included treatment and allogrooming as fixed 
factors, and dyad as a random factor. 
Allogrooming 
To determine if intranasal OT influences allogrooming, we conducted a 
double-blind study where 13 adult females were treated with intranasal OT or saline 
at the same hour on two consecutive days. Doses of OT (1 µg/µl) and saline controls 
were randomly scheduled and labeled with numbers to conceal their identity during 
treatment. On the first day, we treated a bat as described above with saline or OT 
between 1600—2100h, placed it in a 1.5 x 2 x 3 m  home cage with 14 other adult 
females, 22 adult males, and one juvenile male. We then recorded interactions with a 
Sony Nightshot camera and infrared spotlight for 1 hour. For each minute we then 
scored the presence (>5 s) or absence of allogrooming, the identity of the 
allogrooming partner, whether allogrooming was given or received, self-grooming, 
and physical contact without allogrooming. At the same time on the next day, the 
same bat received the opposite treatment.  
We focused on female allogrooming, because most allogrooming in the wild 
occurs among adult females and juveniles of both sexes (Wilkinson 1986) and many 
of the males had been castrated. In pilot trials, we also failed to detect an effect of 




We used Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests (and report the statistic, S) to compare 
the effect of treatment on each response paired within bat. To test if oxytocin 
influenced the extent to which bats preferentially groomed relatives, we first 
multiplied duration of allogrooming with each partner by that partner’s kinship, and 
then averaged across partners in that trial to calculate a nepotism index for each trial. 
The greater the nepotism index, the more allogrooming was targeted towards kin. For 
all cases where allogrooming partners in both trials were identified, we compared the 
nepotism index by treatment. All procedures involving animals adhered to the 
National Institutes of Health Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, and 
were approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Animal Care and Use 




Food sharing was evident in fasting trials because total mouth-licking time 
predicted a recipient’s subsequent weight gain (R2=0.63, p<0.001). However, food 
sharing occurred in only 16 of 39 fasting trials (38 donations out of 152 possible 
dyad-trial cases). We detected no effect of treatment on the presence of food 
donations, which occurred 19 times in each treatment condition. The occurrence of 
food sharing instead varied largely by subject-donor dyad (c2=59.29, p<0.0001).  
For the 38 confirmed donations, we found that donation size increased with 
both OT treatment (R2=0.61, F1,34.1 = 11.43, p=0.0018; least squares means +/-




allogrooming (log-transformed; F1,23.66=67.51, p<0.001). Higher kinship did not 
predict occurrence of food sharing; in fact mean kinship was lower for sharing events 
than non-sharing events across both treatments. Kinship also did not increase 
donation size (log-transformed, F1,14.61=0.0053, p=0.94), and when we included 
kinship and the kinship by treatment interaction in our model, neither factor was 
significant. 
Allogrooming 
OT treatment of females did not change the number of groomers (S=2.6, 
p=0.22), the number of grooming recipients (S=0.5, p=0.48), or the amount of 
physical contact (S=15.5, p=0.30, Figure 4A), but it did increase the number of 
minutes a treated animal engaged in allogrooming overall (S=41, n=13, p=0.002, 
Figure 4B) and per partner (S=5.7, p=0.034). By analyzing the number of grooming 
bats and the effect size at each minute across the trial, we found that the peak effect of 
OT treatments occurred 30-50 minutes after administration (Figure 5).  
For the 8 subjects with known grooming partners in both treatments, we failed 
to detect an effect of treatment on the nepotism index (Wilcoxon Signed Rank S=0.5, 
p=0.50). Most grooming occurred between unrelated bats (63% of grooming dyads in 
trials had estimated kinship values of <0.05, mean kinship=0.09), and there was only 
one dependent pup present at the time. There was a trend towards females grooming 





Oxytocin (OT) increased cooperative investments within existing social 
bonds, but we did not find strong evidence that it either extended investments to more 
partners, or increased investments in fewer partners. The physiological mechanism by 
which inhaled OT affects behavior remains unclear, but studies with rats and mice 
revealed that intranasal OT administration first increased plasma levels, and within 
the next 30 minutes led to increased OT in behaviorally relevant brain areas 
(Neumann et al. 2013). Our data are consistent with these observations in that 
allogrooming was elevated 30-50 min after intranasal OT exposure (Figure 5). 
Over a period of three months, we tracked food-sharing donations among five 
vampire bats (20 dyads), and found that OT treatment increased donation sizes within 
dyads, but did not affect the probability of a given dyad to share food. Our second 
study showed that OT increased female allogrooming within dyads, but did not alter 
the number of grooming partners. These two findings indicate that OT inhalation has 
partner-specific effects on social investment.  
Increasing evidence suggests that the link between cooperative behavior and 
OT depends on the subject’s prior relationship with the partner, exaggerating pre-
existing social predispositions to particular individuals or categories of individuals 
(Crockford et al. 2014 and refs therein). The relationship between prior social bonds 
and OT response is further complicated by the fact that peripheral OT induces 
cooperative behavior, but is also released by it (Crockford et al. 2014). OT-induced 
behaviors or cognitive states can lead to further OT release resulting in a positive 




the relationship between oxytocin and behavior can therefore be limited by 
knowledge of an individual’s prior social relationships. For example, elevated urinary 
OT in wild chimpanzees is caused by both the giving and receiving of allogrooming 
and food sharing, but the effect of food sharing on subsequent urinary OT is stronger 
and more consistent across partners compared to the effect of allogrooming, where 
the release of OT depends on the strength of the existing social bond (Crockford et al. 
2013, Wittig et al. 2014). Given this complex interaction between OT and social 
experience, much can be learned by further studies pairing OT manipulation with 
long-term observations of marked individuals with known social histories, social 
bonds, and kinship relationships.  
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Figure 4. Oxytocin affects allogrooming but not physical contact. Lines show 
changes in time spent in physical contact without allogrooming (A) or allogrooming 







Figure 5. Latency of effect of intranasal oxytocin on allogrooming. Lines show 
number of bats that groomed others during that minute of the trial when dosed with 
oxytocin (blue) or saline (red). Significance (two-tailed p-value or NS) and difference 
between bat-centered treatment means is shown for each 10-min segment. Time zero 






Chapter 4: Vampire bats do not play strict ‘tit for tat’ when 
sharing food 
Abstract  
Reciprocity is often interpreted as a ‘tit-for-tat’ rule where giving help is strictly 
contingent on receiving help. Food sharing among kin and non-kin vampire bats 
(Desmodus rotundus) shows a highly reciprocal pattern, but are these food-sharing 
investments strictly contingent on recent returns? We tested the contingency of food-
sharing bonds in 7 unique vampire bat dyads that had histories of sharing (14 female 
‘subjects’ and ‘primary donors’ including four mothers and their four adult 
daughters). In each of 84 fasting trials, we fasted the subject for 24 h to induce and 
measure food donations from all others, while another bat was excluded from the 
donor pool. Each subject served in a series of fasting trials where we first excluded a 
low-ranking donor, then excluded the primary donor three times; and finally removed 
a low-ranking donor again. During this experiment, females that fed more bats before 
the experiment, also received more food per experimental trial. When we first 
removed primary donors, subjects did not compensate with donations from other bats, 
so they received less food. Despite preventing dyadic food sharing on 3 occasions 
over 3 weeks, we detected no subsequent change in food sharing. Comparisons of kin 
with non-kin were hampered by sample size, but maternal kin were clearly not 
enforcing cooperation using strict contingency alone. We discuss how kinship and 




increasingly clear that vampire bat food-sharing deviates from literal interpretations 
of the tit-for-tat model.  
Introduction 
 Cooperative organisms are expected to target their cooperative investments to 
partners that provide the best inclusive fitness returns. Organisms can ensure indirect 
fitness benefits by discriminating among partners based on kinship (Hamilton 1964, 
Griffin & West 2003), or they can enforce reciprocal direct fitness benefits by 
discriminating among partners based on cooperative returns (Trivers 1971, Rutte & 
Taborsky 2008, Krams et al. 2008, 2013, Kiers et al. 2011, Dolivo & Taborsky 2015, 
reviewed by Carter 2014). Importantly, although kin discrimination and enforcement 
of fitness benefits are often considered as alternative explanations for cooperation, 
they may co-occur and interact (evidence: Koenig 1994, West et al. 2007a, Ratnieks 
& Wenseleers 2008, Zöttl et al. 2013, theory: Frank 1995, Van Cleve & Akçay 2014).  
 Using observations of cooperation among common vampire bats (Desmodus 
rotundus), Wilkinson (1984, 1988) argued that reciprocity could stabilize cooperation 
among relatives. Female vampire bats regurgitate portions of ingested blood meals to 
both related and unrelated adults. Although 95% of these donations observed in the 
wild occurred between relatives, food sharing was even better predicted by prior 
interactions, and reciprocal sharing occurred readily between non-kin (Wilkinson 
1984). To assess the relative importance of kinship and social experience on vampire 
bat food sharing, Carter & Wilkinson (2013a) induced over 200 regurgitations under 
controlled conditions of constant association and mixed relatedness. Results 




and that sharing decisions are not easily explained as a kin selection byproduct 
(Carter & Wilkinson 2013a,b). But two key issues remain unresolved. 
 First, demonstrating reciprocity requires testing contingency, which has not 
been shown experimentally in vampire bats. While some authors use the term 
“reciprocity” to describe correlations between help given and received (e.g. de Waal 
& Luttrell 1988, Hemelrijk 1990, de Waal & Brosnan 2006), such network 
correlations can result from helping decisions based on any symmetrical social factor, 
including kinship, proximity, or group membership (Figure 6). For clarity, we use the 
term “symmetry” to describe positive correlations between help given and received 
across pairs, and reserve the term “reciprocity” for adaptive cooperative investments 
that are in some way contingent on cooperative returns. Dyadic correlations of help 
over time may be suggestive of contingency (e.g. de Waal 2000, Johnstone et al. 
2014), but a convincing demonstration typically requires measuring the extent to 
which individuals shift their investments either away, or towards, partners whose 
ability to provide cooperative returns has been experimentally diminished (e.g. Kiers 
et al. 2011), or enhanced (e.g. Fruteau et al. 2009).  
 Testing contingency in vampire bats has proven difficult because fasting 
events must be separated in time both to protect the health of the animals and because 
overall sharing decreases over time with repeated fasting. Authors often assume that 
the timescale of contingency should be short and strict, following a literal translation 
of “tit for tat” (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, reviewed by Carter 2014), but evidence for 




vampire bat food-sharing is weak (Carter & Wilkinson 2013a). Rather, dyadic food 
sharing becomes balanced over time. 
 Vampire bat food sharing is also highly sensitive to context. We failed to 
induce food sharing across about 40 fasting trials using isolated vampire bat pairs or 
triads in small cages. Bats reliably share food when tested in a familiar group setting, 
but this involves statistically or experimentally controlling for the presence of 
multiple possible partners. Testing contingency in a short timeframe also requires 
reducing help from partners that are reliable and consistent donors. Such donors are 
often matrilineal kin, which brings us to the second issue: the expected degree of 
contingency between genetic relatives is unclear. 
 Depending on the relative importance of direct (reciprocal) and indirect (kin-
selected) fitness benefits in food sharing, the degree of reciprocity can interact with 
kinship in either a positive or negative manner. Wilkinson’s (1988) model of vampire 
bat food sharing suggested that the reciprocal (direct fitness) benefit of sharing 
exceeds any kin-selected (indirect fitness) benefit, at all levels of kinship. Under this 
scenario, the main return on investment in food sharing is an increase in personal 
survival and reproduction (direct fitness) due to reciprocal help rather than an 
increased survival of kin (indirect fitness). Accordingly, it is possible that close kin 
pairs, such as mothers and their adult daughters, might show the strongest 
contingency in sharing because they make the largest investments in each other. Such 
individuals may find the experience of non-reciprocation from these partners to be the 
most unexpected, salient, and costly. This notion is consistent with the observation 




  Alternatively, if food sharing among kin is driven by indirect fitness benefits, 
then it may be largely altruistic, so close kin pairs might show less or no contingency. 
This kind of negative interaction between kinship and the enforcement has been 
found in cooperatively breeding cichlids, where subordinate helpers exchange 
alloparental care for the ability to stay in the group, but related subordinates are 
tolerated more and hence provide less alloparental care in return (Zöttl et al. 2013). 
Similarly, non-reciprocation may be tolerated more by related vampire bats.   
 To test these alternative predictions, we assessed food-sharing contingency in 
both related and unrelated pairs of female vampire bats. We attempted to redirect the 
food-sharing investments of bats away from a reliable and consistent donor towards 
other partners. We first measured the stability and symmetry of the food-sharing 
network using data on allogrooming, food sharing, and kinship among a group of 24-
32 captive vampire bats over a 4-year period. We then selected 14 directional dyads 
by pairing each subject with a unique ‘primary donor’ that consistently shared food. 
These dyads included four pairs of mothers and their adult daughters with strong 
sharing histories, and three dyads of unclear or zero kinship. We measured within-
dyad food given and received across two fasting rounds when they could feed each 
other. Then, we fasted both bats in each dyad simultaneously on 3 treatment rounds 
over 3 weeks, such that neither bat could feed their primary donor but each could be 
fed by others. After this treatment, we again allowed and measured food given and 
received within each dyad.  
 We had three predictions. First, if food sharing is based on stable social bonds, 




decrease in total food received in that trial. Second, we predicted that females with 
larger sharing networks (measured before the experiment) would be fed more during 
the experiment. Third, if food sharing was highly contingent on past sharing, then we 
expected both the amount and proportion of reciprocal food sharing with the targeted 




 All procedures were approved by the University of Maryland Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee (Protocol R-10-63). Animal care and methods for 
inducing food regurgitations are described elsewhere (Carter & Wilkinson 2013a). 
Briefly, we housed vampire bats in a captive colony of 25-45 animals from multiple 
matrilines. To induce food sharing, we removed and fasted 1-2 subjects, returned the 
first bat to the group cage for a 1 h focal sampling observation period, and then the 
second bat for another 1 h observation. All bats were then fed. By measuring the mass 
of bats immediately before and after observation, we found that time spent mouth-
licking was a good predictor of mass gained by the end of the observation period 
(r=0.9). Seconds of mouth-licking is therefore a measure of food-sharing that is 
unaltered by urinating or defecating. We defined ‘food given’ for each directional 
pair as the natural log of (X+1) where X is the total seconds of food-sharing from A 
to B divided by number of 1 h trial chances for A to feed B. We defined ‘food 




Analysis of the baseline long-term food-sharing network  
 To test network correlations via permutation, we used Hemelrijk’s (1990) Kr 
tests and partial Rr tests in SOCPROG 2.5 (Whitehead 2009). These tests indicate if 
food given (A to B) is correlated with food received (B to A) relative to the food 
received from all other bats that could have been donors (i.e. ‘relative reciprocity’ 
Hemelrijk 1990). Food sharing and allogrooming network tests used only pairs that 
had chances to give and receive. We calculated kinship using known birth dates, 
maternal pedigree, and maximum-likelihood estimates of relatedness calculated in the 
program ML-RELATE (Kalinowski et al., 2007) from genotypes of 30 polymorphic 
microsatellite markers (Appendix 4, Table S2, S3). We amplified PCR products from 
DNA extracted from 2-3 mm wing punches using Qiagen DNeasy kits. 
Contingency experiment 
 Our goal in this experiment was to first weaken food-sharing relationships 
between specific pairs by repeatedly inhibiting dyadic food sharing, and then test if 
we could detect a change in the food given when dyadic food sharing was again 
possible. We selected 14 directional dyads by pairing each subject with a unique 
primary donor where donations had previously occurred most reliably and often in 
both directions, but not all bats could be paired with their highest-ranking donor 
(Table S1).  
 We paired as many females as possible with their most preferred sharing 
partners, typically their mother or adult daughter (8 maternal kin dyads, Table S1). 
We did this for two reasons. First, we required strong dyads with consistent sharing 




during the prior baseline period. Any experimental decrease in donation rate is easier 
to detect in dyads with larger, more frequent donations. Second, although contingency 
is most expected between non-kin, it would be most interesting and surprising to see 
contingency as an enforcement mechanism between relatives. Thus, this design 
allowed us to determine if contingent reciprocity operates between close kin. 
 Across 84 fasting trials, we put each subject through 6 rounds of fasting: two 
pre-treatment rounds, three treatment rounds, and one post-treatment round. We 
fasted two bats a day, so each round required 7 days. During each round, we fasted 
two females simultaneously on each trial day such that one bat could not feed the 
other because it was absent or unfed, but so that each bat could be fed by 13 other 
females or 11-15 males (Figure 7). All other males were placed on the other side of a 
mesh curtain. During the three treatment rounds, we simultaneously fasted our 
selected pairs. During pre- and post-treatment rounds, we simultaneously fasted pairs 
with little or no history of sharing (Figure 7). 
 We were first interested in whether each subject’s primary donor would be 
replaced by other donors when the primary donor was missing or unfed. When a 
subject’s primary donor was unavailable, would that subject receive the same total 
amount of food? To answer this question, we tested whether the total food received 
(paired by subject) differed between the pre-treatment and treatment rounds. To 
ensure that any decline we observed actually occurred when the subject was first 
removed, we calculated the change in total food received from the previous round 
(current round minus previous round) for each bat. To examine which rounds showed 




confidence interval of the change, and tested whether the decline in total food 
received by subjects during round three (when the primary donor was first removed) 
was on average a greater decline than the mean for the other rounds.  
 Our main interest was in the contingency, reflected by the change from the 
pre-treatment to post-treatment for each subject. Using both absolute values and 
arcsin-transformed proportions of total food received, we compared the mean 
amounts of food received from primary donors during pre- and post-treatment rounds. 
We used paired t-tests because the distributions of changes in total food received 
(food received in current – previous round) were highly normal overall (test of 
deviation from normality: Shapiro-Wilk W= 0.99, p=0.9) and within each round (W 
range=0.94-0.98).  To examine the effect of a subject’s sharing network size on 
subsequent sharing success, we used linear regression to test (1) if females that fed 
more partners from 2010-2014 had more donors in the contingency experiment, and 
(2) if the number of donors a subject had on average during the experiment explained 
between-subject variation in total food received.  
 For all parametric tests, we tested for deviations from normality using a 
goodness of fit test. We conducted all t-tests assuming unequal variances in JMP 11 
(SAS 2013). When normality assumptions were violated, we calculated permutation 
p-values using the lmPerm package in R. To help interpret null results, we present 
95% confidence intervals rather than post hoc power analyses, which are easily 





Food-sharing network symmetry and stability 
 The vampire bat food-sharing network from 2013-2014 was both symmetrical 
and consistent with data from previous years (2010-2012 network data from Carter & 
Wilkinson 2013; Hemelrijk Kr-test, p<0.0002, n=30 in both cases). Similar to past 
results (Carter & Wilkinson 2013), subsequent patterns of food-sharing were not well 
predicted by kinship (p=0.3), but were predicted by allogrooming (p<0.0002). Female 
allogrooming networks in 2014 were not correlated with kinship (p=0.5), but were 
consistent with measures from 2012 (p<0.0002, data from Carter & Wilkinson 2013). 
Pairs that allogroomed when sampled in 2012 were more likely to groom when 
sampled in 2014 (Fisher’s exact test: p<0.0001). Using all data from 2010-2014, 
food-sharing symmetry remained significant when controlling for either kinship 
(Hemelrijk partial Rr-test, p<0.0002) or grooming received (p=0.0066, Appendix 4).  
Contingency experiment 
 Removing a subject’s ‘primary donor’ led to a decrease in the total food 
it received. Subjects received a mean of 227 s less food sharing when their primary 
donor, rather than another bat, was removed from the donor pool (paired t=-3.23, 
df=13, p=0.0066), and this decline in food received occurred during the round when 
the primary donor was first removed (Figure 8). The mean decline in food received 
during this round (mean=224 s, 95% CI=54--394 s) was greater than the mean change 




 Treatment did not noticeably affect the number of donors. We did not 
detect a significant change in the number of donors when the primary donor was first 
removed (mean=-0.36, 95% CI=-0.84 to 0.13 bats), nor did the change differ from the 
other rounds (t=0.54, df=35.1, p=0.6). We also did not detect fewer donors in trials 
where a subject’s mother or daughter was present (t=0.03, df=40, p=0.97). The mean 
number of donors across all trials was 2.6 bats (95% CI=2.3--2.9).  
 Females with larger sharing networks were fed more during the 
experiment. Females that fed more bats in our 2010-2014 dataset, collected before 
the contingency experiment, subsequently had more donors during the experiment 
(R2=0.30, F(1,12)=5.04, n=14, permutation p=0.044). The number of donors a subject 
had averaged across all experiment rounds explained 53% of the between-subject 
variation in food received (also averaged across all rounds; F(1,12)=13.3, p=0.0034).  
 Food-sharing bonds were robust to three fasting rounds without dyadic 
sharing. When comparing the pre-treatment to post-treatment period, we detected no 
within-dyad change in absolute food received from the donor (mean=-20.68 s, 95% 
CI=-177 to +136 s, t=-0.29, df=10, p=0.77; Figure 9) or in the donor’s proportion of 
the total food received (mean=+18%, 95% CI= -34% to +70%, paired t-test with 
arcsin-transformed proportions: t=0.78, df=10, p=0.45; Figure 10). Food received 
from the primary donor post-treatment was greater than during the treatment, i.e. zero 
(permutation Z test, Z=2.52, one-sided p= 0.006), and it showed a rebound to near its 
original level (Figure 10).  
 In only three of seven possible cases did the maternal kin donors feed their 




Figure 11). We lacked the ability to detect a treatment effect in three of the other 
subjects (bats B, C, O; Table 1), because they were not fed by their ‘primary donors’ 
during the two pre-treatment rounds. Since these dyadic sharing values could not be 
decreased further, we excluded these bats from the contingency analysis. But 
including these 3 bats did not change our main results. After the treatment trials, two 
of the three remaining non-kin subjects were fed by the targeted donor less (M, N) 
and one was fed more (P), with the sharing amounts measured either absolutely or as 
percentages of the total (Figure 11).  
 Because we removed half the non-kin subjects from the analysis, the rebound 
in sharing was driven primarily by the four mother-daughter pairs (Figure 10). 
Compared to the three non-kin donors that did feed each other, the four mothers and 
four adult daughters gave on average 176 s more food (95% CI=39--313 s, t=2.9, 
df=8.75, p=0.0175) and provided 44% more of the total food received by subjects 
(95% CI= +22--67%, t=4.6, df=7.17, p=0.0023; Figure 10). However, we failed to 
detect a difference between maternal kin and non-kin with regards to the change in 
sharing between pre-and post-treatment (absolute value: t=0.62, df=5.1, p=0.6; 
proportion of total: t=0.93, df=8, p=0.4). 
Discussion 
 We found no evidence for short-term contingency. After 3 weeks of sharing 
with other partners, food sharing within the pairs we targeted rebounded to near their 
original levels. When ‘primary donors’ were first removed, subjects could not replace 
their food sharing contribution using other partners. This confirms past evidence that 




familiarity (Carter & Wikinson 2013a,b). Female bats have networks of multiple 
donors that vary in size (this study: mean= 2.5, range 0—6 bats), and the size of a 
female bat’s donor network was correlated with the number of bats it fed in the past. 
The number of donors a bat had in the contingency experiment explained about half 
the variation in total food received among bats (Appendix 3, Figure S7). Yet females 
cannot easily or quickly replace the help from their primary donors, especially 
maternal kin, with other partners. Both quantity and quality of social bonds matters. 
 The results of our study must be interpreted with several limitations in mind. 
First, we lacked the power to reliably compare any difference in contingency between 
kin and non-kin, since 3 of 6 non-kin donors did not initially donate during the pre-
treatment rounds. This lack of sharing does not indicate that non-kin do not form 
stable sharing bonds. The existence of non-kin bonds is evident from past field and 
captive studies (Carter & Wilkinson 2013b). In this group, allogrooming and sharing 
were both more consistent and correlated than expected by chance among non-kin 
(Appendix 3, Table S4). Rather, these weak levels of sharing stem at least in part 
from how we paired the limited number of females.  
 When constructing our experimental dyads, we could not pair every bat with 
its primary donor. Some bats shared primary donors and bats could not serve in 
multiple dyads for statistical and logistical reasons (e.g. recovery times for fasting). 
We therefore paired females with their primary maternal kin donors when they were 
available. This led to 7 of 8 bats with maternal relatives being paired with their top 
ranked donor, and only one bat being paired with its second rank donor (its daughter; 




reliable and consistent sharing relationships required for testing short-term 
contingency in a group setting. Since the remaining six females had to be paired with 
each other, only two were paired with their top ranked donor, three were paired with 
second ranked donors, and one bat was paired with a low ranked donor (Table S1).   
 As a consequence, our overall results are driven by mothers and their adult 
daughters (8 of the 11 subjects we analyzed). This is not, however, ecologically 
unrealistic, because most of the food sharing among adult vampire bats in the wild 
occurs between close maternal kin. The bond between adult mother and adult 
daughter vampire bats is one of the strongest and most common adult relationships in 
vampire bat social networks, which is consistent with other mammals living in groups 
with mixed relatedness and female philopatry (e.g. bison: Green 1989, wild boar: 
Kaminski et al. 2005, giraffes: Bashaw et al. 2007, baboons and other primates: Silk 
et al. 2006, Seyfarth & Cheney 2012; woodrats: Moses & Millar 1994; elephants: 
Archie et al. 2006; insectivorous bats: Kerth et al. 2003). In vampires, the frequent 
sharing within mother and adult daughter bonds makes this relationship a good first 
place to search for contingency, especially because any contingency found here 
would indicate a potential interaction between enforcement and kin selection. 
 Another limitation to this study was that we did not sample allogrooming rates 
in our targeted pairs during the 6 weeks of experimental fasting trials. It is possible 
that bats used allogrooming to compensate for a lack of food sharing and to maintain 
social bonds, as found in primates (Seyfarth & Cheney 1984, de Waal 1997, Gomes 
& Boesch 2011, Sabbatini et al. 2012 , Fruteau et al. 2009). In vampire bats, this 




when considering either all sharing pairs or only related pairs, the best predictor of 
the amount of food given by A to B is the amount of food A received from B. But 
when considering only non-kin pairs (kinship <0.05), the best predictor of food given 
is not food received but rather allogrooming received (Appendix 3, Table S3). This 
result makes sense if one considers that food sharing, unlike allogrooming, is a 
relatively rare event with a limited number of donors. Food sharing is inherently 
dyadic. That is, food given from A to B may decrease food given from A to C, and 
also decrease food given from C to B. The same is not true for allogrooming: one bat 
can be groomed simultaneously by two or more conspecifics. From each bat’s point 
of view, this should make allogrooming a more reliable way to maintain social bonds, 
especially when individuals have multiple social partners. 
 One clear conclusion is that vampire bat food sharing deviates from many 
assumptions of models based on ‘tit-for-tat’ in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
(Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). These models had a large and important 
impact on subsequent social evolution theory. Unfortunately, literal translations of the 
tit-for-tat model have led to experimental predictions that overemphasize isolated 
single-partner pairs, strict-short-term contingency, and exchanges of a single type of 
discrete service (reviewed by Carter 2014; Chapter 1). Although these assumptions 
originally kept the tit-for-tat model simple, they also constrained how experimenters 
viewed and tested cooperation in later decades (Noë 2006). Increasing evidence 
suggests enforcement mechanisms can depend crucially on factors missing from the 




non-binary) investments, multiple “currencies” (e.g. grooming, food sharing, 
defense), and long term-social bonds (Carter 2014; Chapter 1).  
 Reciprocal food sharing in vampire bats was one of the earliest and most 
convincing examples of reciprocity largely because one part of the study in particular 
appeared to closely match the features of the tit-for-tat model (Wilkinson 1984). 
When fasting trials were conducted in a captive sample of unrelated bats with varying 
co-roosting association, the resulting pattern of 13 food donations was not random; 
groupmates appeared to pair up and take turns as donor and recipient. This pattern 
looked like tit for tat because it involved pairs contingently exchanging a single 
service. But our more recent analyses suggest that vampire bats do not show strict 
short-term contingency within each pair. Furthermore, stable bonds can change when 
bats are moved from one colony to another (GGC, unpublished data), which shows 
that partner choice and switching is also possible.  
 The role of multiple donors has the additional consequence of dividing the 
total cost of feeding a hungry bat among several donors. In our experiments, even 
bats that had a mother or daughter present during their observation period, received 
on average about half of their food from other donors (Figure 11). Non-kin food 
sharing in vampire bats may therefore be adaptive because it allows bats to maintain a 
wider social network of donors. This is consistent with the fact that vampire bats that 
fed more bats, and hence more unrelated bats, had more donors (Appendix 3 Figure 
S8), and that bats with more partners previously had more donors during the 




 Our results do not resolve the controversy over whether vampire bat food-
sharing is stabilized by reciprocity. Some models assume that vampire bat food 
sharing among nonkin simply represents a lack of kin discrimination within a 
predominantly matrilineal group or a situation where returns on a cooperative 
investment are ensured by circumstances other than the partner’s response (e.g. 
pseudoreciprocity; see Foster 2004 for a multi-level selection model, see Carter 2014, 
Chapter 1, for a critical evaluation). According to these models, the marginal costs of 
sharing small amounts of food may be so low that even consistent individual variation 
in food sharing cannot result in “subtle cheating” (donors giving consistently less 
gaining the fitness benefits without paying the same costs). The cost of making food-
sharing investments more precise may be greater than the benefit. However, these 
models provide no testable predictions as to the design of cooperative decisions, so 
such models must be treated as null hypotheses at best. 
 A more adaptationist view suggests that bats enforce reciprocal food sharing 
in a way that is more nuanced and complex than simple tit-for-tat. If a long-term 
social bond leads to a form of reciprocity with a more complex and robust design, 
then this would explain why the clearest evidence of short-term contingent reciprocity 
comes from situations where the cooperating partners lack social bonds (plants and 
fungi: Kiers et al. 2011; birds on neighboring territories: Godard 1993, Akçay et al. 
2009, Krams et al. 2008, 2013; trained rats: e.g. Rutte & Tabosky 2008, Dolivo & 
Taborksy 2015). And this would explain why evidence for reciprocity has been so 




 In a long-term cooperative social bond, there are multiple cooperative returns 
from multiple types of cooperative investments, that may be conceptually reduced to 
a single measure of relationship quality, i.e. “emotional score-keeping” (e.g. Schino 
& Aureli 2009, Jaeggi et al. 2012, Seyfarth & Cheney 2012). As a consequence, strict 
contingencies within each service become less important and obvious. This 
hypothesis can explain the paradoxical finding that short-term contingency in 
primates is weakest in strongly bonded partners and strongest in weakly-bonded 
partners (humans: Shackleford & Buss 1996, other primates: Seyfarth & Cheney 
2012). Strong friendships are characterized by diverse social investments and subtle 
contingency. 
 Unfortunately, if cooperation in a given species is indeed explained by this 
more complex model of reciprocity (social bonds with multiple services, long-term 
contingencies, and a supply and demand of partners), then such cooperative 
relationships will also be far more difficult to manipulate, and as a consequence, an 
empirical test of the reciprocity hypothesis is more difficult than often recognized 
(but see Seyfarth & Cheney 1988). But such tests are not impossible. We suggest that 
testing the enforcement of cooperation in a complex social network may require 
experimentally manipulating a single service while measuring multiple responses 
towards multiple individuals in a group setting that allows partner choice. 
 In conclusion, vampire bat social bonds may not be strictly contingent in the 
short-term, perhaps because bats depend on a network of bonded individuals and 
these bonds likely integrate multiple services, such as allogrooming (Wilkinson 1986) 




Russo 2002). Moreover, regurgitated food sharing is a relatively rare event that 
cannot be induced quickly multiple times in succession. Measuring the role of 
contingency in vampire bat food sharing will require manipulating and tracking 
multiple cooperative services (e.g. food sharing, allogrooming, and clustering) in 










Figure. 6 Three examples of network symmetry without contingency. Nodes are 
individuals. Arrows are helping behaviors. Panel A: individuals are helping others 
based on phenotype similarity (color). Panel B: Helping is based on proximity. Panel 







Figure 7. Contingency experiment for a single subject. Circles are bats. Arrows 
show food given. We first collected baseline data on food-sharing networks from 
2010-2014 (mean and median number of donors= 8), then paired 14 subjects (S) with 
a unique partner that was a consistent and reliable donor (Circle 1). During treatment 
trials, we prevented reciprocal sharing by simultaneously fasting the subject (bat S) 
and its primary donor (bat 1). We then measured food given to subject (S) from all 
other bats. During pre- and post-treatment trials, we simultaneously fasted bats with 
little or no food-sharing history (S and non-donor), and then measured food given to 
subject (S) from primary donor (1) and all other bats. Thirteen potential male donors 





Figure 8. Mean change in total food received between each fasting round. Red 
bar shows the round when the bat’s primary donor was first removed from the donor 






Figure 9. Food received by bats during contingency experiment. Bars show mean 
food received from targeted primary donor (blue) and all other donors (red) during 







Figure 10. Proportion of food received by kinship. Bars show primary donor’s 
mean percentage contribution to the total food received before (grey) and after (black) 
the treatment rounds. Means and standard error bars are shown for three non-kin bats, 
and eight bats whose primary donors were mothers or daughters. We excluded from 






Figure 11. Proportions of food received from each donor. For each female bat 
(letters), the mean percentage of food received from other females (color) is shown 
for the first round of each treatment period. Gray shades shows donations from sons 
(light gray) and other adult males (dark gray). Brackets show experimental pairings. 
Starred bats are mothers and adult daughters. We excluded bats B, C, and O from the 







Selected excerpts from an invited review for Communicative and Integrative 
Biology, “Does food sharing in vampire bats demonstrate reciprocity?” (Carter 
& Wilkinson 2013b)  
… previously unpublished data from 2010 suggests that food sharing may 
require social bonds that require development over long periods of time. In Trinidad, 
we captured 5 females at 5 sites that were 20-90 km apart. We conducted three 
separate food-sharing experiments to see if these previously unfamiliar individuals 
would begin sharing food after being kept in captivity together for several weeks. To 
assess changes in allogrooming over time, we also conducted random focal sampling 
of allogrooming. We ranked the amount of time each bat spent grooming others, then 
tested whether the mean ranks across bats increased over time using a permutation 
test (lmPerm package in R). We never observed food sharing, but we found that bats 
began begging others on the second and third sets of fasting trials on days 21 and 36 
(Table 1). We also found that allogrooming increased over time among the previously 
unfamiliar bats (R2=0.45, F(1,10)=8.3, p=0.018).  
We conducted other trials with groups of female common vampire bats that 
may have been previously familiar. Two groups in Trinidad and Belize were captured 
flying in close proximity (in the same mist net within a roughly 5 minute period). We 
tested another group of vampire bats captured from the same tree hollow in Trinidad, 
but again with unknown levels of association. In all 4 groups (n=48 fasting trials), we 




In sharp contrast, we observed food sharing consistently among kin and non-
kin that have been housed together in long-term captivity (Table 1). Under these 
conditions, all females are generally fed when fasted, including females born in 
different populations but housed with others for multiple years (discussed below). 
Although observations of food sharing have been mostly restricted to groups with 
known levels of high association, sharing between bats from different populations has 
also been observed once in Costa Rica (Wilkinson 1984). Therefore, factors other 
than previous association, such as variations in behavior due to geographic origin or 
stress, might also explain the presence or absence of food sharing across these groups 
(Table 1).  
... In the original paper (Carter & Wilkinson 2013a) we used 13 microsatellite 
loci to estimate kinship, but we have since reanalyzed the data using more precise 
kinship estimates based on information from 25 variable microsatellite loci, and our 
conclusions have remained the same. Our new updated model (adjusted R2=0.38, 
F(5,306)=37.0) still includes reciprocal help (β=0.32, p<0.0002), donor sex (β=0.26, 
p<0.0002), allogrooming received (β=0.20, p<0.0002), and the interaction between 
kinship and reciprocal help (β=0.06, p=0.04) in the same order of relative importance.  



















5 unfamiliar bats 
caught at different 
locations in Trinidad 
then placed together 
for 6 days  




after 6 days, 
begging only 
at 21 and 36 
days 
unpublished 
6 captured together in 
mist nets from one 
location in Trinidad 






5 captured together in 
a mist net from one 
site in Belize 









from same roost tree 
in  Trinidad 









roostmates from a 
site in Costa Rica 








long-term captivity 0.15 +/- 0.06, 
(maternal 
pedigree) 






long-term captivity 0.06 +/- 0.10, 
0-0.58 
(25 loci) 










*Begging is defined as the fasted subject licking the mouth of a conspecific; sharing 
involves the same plus subsequent weight gain in the fasted subject. 






















































Supplement to Chapter 2: Food sharing in vampire bats: reciprocal help predicts 
donations more than relatedness or harassment  
 
Supplement to Methods 
 We carried out our study in accordance with the Animal Behavior Society 
Guidelines for the Use of Animals in Research (2012), and the Organization for Bat 
Conservation (Bloomfield Hills, MI, USA).  
Microsatellite analysis 
 We used the web program PRIMER 3 (http://frodo.wi.mit.edu/) to design 
primers for 12 Desmodus rotundus DNA sequences from published repeats (Piaggio 
et al. 2008) in GenBank, and added 1 additional published microsatellite marker, 
Tsil3Ca2 (Dechmann et al. 2002). For these 13 microsatellite loci (Carter & 
Wilkinson 2012), we compared the frequency, and observed and expected 
heterozygosities from the 25 bats genotyped in our population with 16 free-ranging 
adult common vampire bats netted in Trinidad, West Indies.  We failed to find a 
significant difference in heterozygosities between observed and expected values 
(paired t=1.85, n=13, p>0.05) or between the two populations (paired t=1.2, n=13, 
p>0.05). We used the programs ML-RELATE (Kalinowski et al. 2006) and 
MICROCHECKER (Van Oosterhout et al. 2004) to check and account for potential 
scoring errors and null alleles. For 3 loci, we used ML-RELATE to calculate 
maximum likelihood estimates of the frequency of null alleles for all calculations 





 To determine if individual food donations were exchanged in a reciprocal 
manner over time, we examined the sequence of sharing events across trials. For this 
analysis we only analysed trials where donors were previously subjects. We also only 
included mouth-licking bouts longer than 15 s to remove instances of begging. We 
then tested (1) if the donation size from bat B to bat A in a trial was predicted by the 
size of the most recent previous donation from A to B, and (2) if the percentage of 
B’s contribution to the total food received by A in a trial was predicted by the 
percentage of A’s contribution to the total food received by B in the most recent 
previous donation from A to B.  
Consistency analysis 
 To test for evidence of symmetrical and consistent dyadic relationships over 
time, we examined the amount (food donated/chances to give) and the presence or 
absence of food sharing for dyads that had multiple chances to donate. We used 
Mantel and randomization tests to assess similarity of (1) presence and amounts of 
food sharing in subsequent fasting rounds, (2) presence and amounts of food sharing 
six months apart, (3) allogrooming given and received within dyads, and (4) the food-
sharing matrix with its transpose, using bats that both served as subjects and were 
available as donors in every round (67% of the total possible food sharing dyads).  
Supplement to Results 
Pattern of food sharing  
 We induced food sharing on 48 out of 52 days over a period of 780 days. 




(4-8 months old) were always fed by at least one other bat, while 4 of 9 adult males 
were never fed. After controlling for chances to give and receive, adult females 
donated 78% and received 57% of the total amount of food donated, while juveniles 
provided and received an additional 13% and 15% respectively. We observed no food 
sharing between adult males. However, we did observe two unrelated adult males 
feeding a male juvenile, and sharing between two unrelated 8 month-old males. Sixty-
three of the 98 dyads that shared food had relatedness estimates less than 0.05 (Figure 
S2). This percentage (64%) is close to the number expected if partners were chosen at 
random with respect to relatedness because 208 of 312 possible food-sharing dyads 
(67%) were related by less than 0.05.  
 Recipients were fed by an average of 3.9 donors in a trial (range=1-7). The 
median food donated from a donor to recipient in a trial was 191 s (N=204 donations, 
mean=339 s, range=5-3315 s). When scaling by chances to give, female donors gave 
food to recipients for an average of 256 s (S.E.=45), and male donors gave for an 
average of 164 s (S.E.=89). One feeding donation lasting 3315 s from an adult female 
to a highly related two-year old male was an extreme outlier (Figure S1). The total 
amount of food received from all donors during the 2 h period was typically about 5% 
of an adult recipient’s mass, which restored ~20% of mass lost during 24 h of fasting. 
The donation during a trial consisted of several mouth-licking bouts, and the median 
length of a mouth-licking bout was 40 s (mean=79.9, S.D.=131.6 s).  
Predictors of food sharing across dyads 
 Food received (p<0.0002), donor sex (p<0.0002), and allogrooming received 




among the 312 dyads where food sharing could have occurred (Figure S4, S5). 
However, within the subset of 98 dyads that shared food, food donation size was 
predicted by relatedness (R2=0.063, p=0.0032) and food received (R2=0.049, 
p=0.0324) in separate univariate analyses. We found no significant predictors when 
these factors were considered simultaneously. The effect of relatedness was driven 
largely by extended maternal care. Mothers feeding their pups or putative subadult 
offspring (ages 4-31 months) constitute four of the largest donations (Figure S6, three 
largest outliers in Figure S1). If these dyads are removed, relatedness is no longer a 






Appendix 2 Supplementary Figures  
 
Figure S1. Distribution of mean mouth-licking times before and after log 
transformation. Mouth-licking time was used to estimate food donated to the 
subject. Box shows the distance of the interquartile range, the whiskers extend that 






Figure S2. Food donated values shown as a sociomatrix. Columns are donors and 
rows are fasted subjects. Blank squares have zero values and black squares are dyads 
that did not have an opportunity to donate or receive food. Dyads are coloured 
according to estimates of pairwise relatedness (r): white for r estimates 0—0.05, light 
green for r estimates between 0.05—0.25, and blue for r estimates >0.25. Numbers 






Figure S3. Box plot showing food donated by donor sex. Box shows the distance 
of the interquartile range, the whiskers extend that range 1.5 times, and the line within 






Figure S4. Logistic regression plot.  The effect of log food received and relatedness 
on the presence of food sharing is shown. 
 
Figure S5. Frequency histograms showing proportion of dyads that shared food 
across values of food received and relatedness. Grey bars show dyads that could 
have shared food in both directions and black bars show dyads that did share food. 
Length of bars above horizontal line is reduced by 95% to fit graph (length is equally 





Figure S6. Relationship between relatedness and food donated. Values for 






Supplement to Chapter 3: Intranasal oxytocin increases social grooming and food 
sharing in the common vampire bat Desmodus rotundus 
 
Additional allogrooming experiment with young males. We tested each of 
12 young males (ages 4-23 months) by treating them with OT or saline as described 
above, then placing them with their mothers in a smaller (0.3 x 0.4 x 0.5 m) plexiglass 
cage. We video recorded this caged dyad for 1 hour on 2 different days at the same 
hour (1700 or 1800h) with a Sony Nightshot camera and infrared spotlight. Observers 
that were blind to the treatment scored the seconds of allogrooming given and 
received by the unmarked male. We detected no effect on allogrooming given 
(Wilcoxon Signed rank test, S=5.5, p=0.72), received (S=3,p=0.34), total 






Supplement to Chapter 4: Vampire bats do not play strict ‘tit for tat’ when 
sharing food 
 













B* C Unknown 1 0.4 12 
C* B Unknown 2 (1=A) 0.4 7 
E F Mother of F 1 0.5 13 
F E Daughter of E 1 0.5 1.5 
G H Mother of H 1 0.5 9 
H G Daughter of G 1 0.5 3 
I J Mother of J 1 0.5 17 
J I Daughter of I 1 0.5 1.5 
K L Mother of L 2 (1=M) 0.5 8 
L K Daughter of K 1 0.5 2 
M N Unknown 2 (1=G) 0 18 
N M Unknown 2 (1=O) 0 8 
O* P Unknown 9 (1=N) 0 9 
P O Unknown 1 0 6 
1. Food received rank among all subject’s female donors from high to low. *excluded 






Table S2. Polymorphic microsatellite loci 
Label Seq TempM HW-p Motif Product (sizes) 
Dr1-1 1 60.1/59.1 0.03 (CT)25;(CA)23 10 (124-170) 
Dr2-2 1 60.3/60.0 0.55 (CA)11 6 (161-173) 
Dr3-3 1 60.0/60.7 NA (CA)8 1 (145) 
Dr4-4 1 60.4/59.8 0.56 (GA)9 9 (144-184) 
Dr5-5 1 60.4/59.0 0.04 (CT)6 2 (114-116) 
Dr6-6 1 59.9/59.9 0.11 (CA)21 8 (132-151) 
Dr7-7 1 59.8/57.4 0.0022 (GA)21 6 (138-160) 
Dr8-8 1 60.6/60.0 0.25 (GT)9 7 (147-161) 
Dr9-9 1 59.9/60.5 0.052 (CA)17 8 (128-152) 
Dr10-10 1 60.1/60.8 0 (GT)7;(GA)20 8 (143-194) 
Dr 11-11 1 59.2/60.1 0.0062 (GA)18 6 (151-174) 
Dr12-12 1 60.1/60.0 0.0014 (GT)15 3 (117-132) 
Dr13-Ts9 2 60.0/60.0 0.0014 (GT)21 10 (177-207) 
Dr14-14 3 59.1/58.4 0.27 (CA)12 5 (223-235) 
Dr15-15 3 58.9/58.0 0.084 (CA)11 8 (199-218) 
Dr16-16 3 58.1/59.0 0.002 (CA)13 7 (179-195) 
Dr17-17 3 58.0/59.1 0 (GT)20 6 (175-189) 
Dr18-18 3 57.0/58.9 0.25 (GT)10 4 (196-206) 
Dr19-19 3 58.3/59.2 0 (GT)13, (GT)4 3 (176-189) 
Dr20-23 3 60.7/59.0 0.0002 (TATC)9;(TC)19 3 (121-152) 
Dr21-28b 3 59.4/58.4 0.94 (CA)8 3 (128-134) 
Dr22-32 3 58.7/58.6 0 (CT)8;(CT)5 4 (232-245)* 
Dr23-35 3 60.7/59.8 0 (CA)20 6 (173-187)* 
Dr24-02 3 60.4/58.2 0.56 (AGC)8 2 (143-149) 
Dr25-c7 4 61.7/62.0 0.084 (AATG)6 4 (236-247) 
Dr26-dr1 5 59.9/59.6 0.91 (AAAC)9 5 (109-123)* 
Dr27-dr7 5 56.0/57.4 0 (AATG)6 6 (163-181)* 
Dr28-dr9 6 58.4/60.3 0.85 (CA)9 5 (120-126) 
Dr29-dr12 6 59.9/59.2 0.43 (GA)8 2 (212-216) 
Dr30-dr15 6 60.7/60.1 0.44 (AGAT)12 8 (145-203) 
Dr31-dr17 6 60.1/60.4 0.52 (CA)13 5 (159-209) 
Seq= Sequence Source: (1) Piaggio et al. 2008: GenBank Accession # EF591569–
EF591580; (2) Dechmann et al. 2002: GenBank Accession # AF431030; (3) 
GenBank Accession # PRJNA279293 (DR_1); (4) McCulloch & Stevens 2011: 
AL2_27850; (5) GenBank Accession # PRJNA279293 (DR_2);(6) GenBank 
Accession # PRJNA279293 (DR_3); HW-p= p-value for Hardy-Weinberg test of 
heterozygote deficiency (low=below expected). TempM= melting temperature of 
L/R primer (Table S3); Motif= type and number of repeats in source sequence; 
Product= number of products in captive study group (observed size range). 




Table S3. Microsatellite primer sequences  
Label 
 
Left primer sequence 
(5’ to 3’) 
Right primer sequence 
(5’ to 3’) 
Dr1-1 CATCACACGTCTTTCCATGC GGCCAAACTAATACATTAACTAAGAGG 
Dr2-2 GGCAAGTTGGGAGAGTTCCT AGACTCGCCATCTCCTGAAA 
Dr3-3 CAGGACAGGATACATCGTGAAA TGCGTGTTGTTGTGTAGTGATG 
Dr4-4 CACCTCCACTTAACATTTCTCC TCCTCCTTCCTTCCTTCCTC 
Dr5-5 CTTGGCCTTCACAAAGCAGT TTGTTTTAATGCCCTTTTTGG 
Dr6-6 TCCATCTTGATGGGAACCTC ACCTTCAACCCCACTCACAC 
Dr7-7 CCCTGTCTCTGCCTTCATTC TTGTAAGTTGTTAACCGTTTTCC 
Dr8-8 GGCCTAGGGCAAGAATGAGT CACGATGCACCCACAGATAC 
Dr9-9 CTCCTGCTGGGTCACCTAAG TATGACGGATGCATGTGAGG 
Dr10-10 CAGAGTGCATTTGGCTCTGA CAAGGCCGATAGTCGTTGAG 
Dr 11-11 CCCATCGTGCATACTGAAAG ACACCGTCTCTTGCTCTTGC 
Dr12-12 TTAAGTCCACTGCCCCAGAC TTCCTGGTTACTCCCTGTGG 
Dr13-Ts9 TGGCACCACTTTCTTGTCAG TGGTGGTGGTCACAGGAATC 
Dr14-14 CAGCAAATGACTCAGCAGCA TGCCCTGTCTAACGATCACT 
Dr15-15 ACCCAAGTGCCCATAGACAA TGGTCCAGTGTATCTTAAATCGG 
Dr16-16 AGTCCCATATTCAGCCCTGT TTTGTCTCCCTTTGCTTGCC 
Dr17-17 CTGACTGGGAATCGAACTGG ACATGCACCATTGAGCTGTG 
Dr18-18 AGTTAGTGTGCCAGCGAG TCACACCCACTGCTCTCAAT 
Dr19-19 ACAAGAAAAGGGGAAGGTGTG TCACTGCTGCTTCTTGACCT 
Dr20-23 CTGAGAGGGGCCGGTTCT GTCGTAGTGTAGTGTGTGTGTG 
Dr21-28b AGCCAACACTGACATGCAC GGGTGTATGTGTAGACGTGC 
Dr22-32 ATATCTTCCCATCCGAGGCC TCTTCCTGGTTCTATGTTGGAGA 
Dr23-35 CTGACTGGGAATCGAACTGG CATGCACCATTGAGCTGTG 
Dr24-02 TTGTGTGAGAAGCTCCCAGG GGGACTACACTTCTTTCCCTC 
Dr25-c7 TCCACAGCTAAGGGACTAACCC TGGCCTTTCAATTACACCCC 
Dr26-dr1 GAGTGCAAACGTCCTAACCAG CATTGTGTCAGGCAGGAGTG 
Dr27-dr7 ATCTCACGTAATGCTGACAG TGACAAACGCAGATCTGATTC 
Dr28-dr9 TTCACGCATGGACTTCTACC ACGGACCGAGAGAGAAATCAC 
Dr29-dr12 CCACTCAGGTCTCCGTACTG AACTGATCAGCGTGTTTCCC 
Dr30-dr15 ACCTCTGCCATTGGTCAAGG GCTGTGCAACTATCACCATCC 





Analysis of food sharing 2010-2014 
 To test the relative importance of social factors in a multivariate model for 
food given among dyads, we z-transformed all variables and then entered food 
received, grooming received, kinship, donor sex and subject sex (encoded as dummy 
variables) into a backward stepwise regression using AIC in JMP 11. After removing 
variables, we then re-tested the remaining variables and all possible interactions using 
the more restrictive Bayesian Information Criterion for model simplicity. To test this 
model, we permuted food donated to sets of predictor variables using the lmp 
function in the R package lmPerm (see Carter & Wilkinson 2013 for more detail). We 
ran 10,000,000 permutations to ensure stable p-values.  
 For dyads of known pedigree relationship, we replaced the relatedness 
estimates from genotyping data with the appropriate kinship level (0.5 for parent-
offspring, and full sibs, 0.25 for half-sibs, etc). The original and adjusted values were 
highly correlated (r= 0.92), and we used the pedigree-adjusted values in our model 
because, for explaining variation in food given, the adjusted values (R2=0.16) 
outperformed the original kinship estimates (R2=0.14). We re-tested the model with 
subsets of kin (>0.05) and non-kin (<0.05) dyads to interpret kinship interactions. 
 Permutation tests on our final model revealed that food given was predicted 
by food received, grooming received, the interaction between food received and 
kinship, and donor sex (Table S4). Among kin dyads, food given was predicted by 
food received with an effect that increased with kinship; however, among non-kin 






Table S4. Predictors of food given 






Predictors coefficient P coefficient P coefficient P 
food received 
            
0.35 0.0022 0.44 0.0086  NS 
grooming 
received  
                






0.16 0.0001 0.19 0.017  NS 
donor sex           
 




 NS  NS  NS 
kinship 
 
 NS  NS  NS 
1. adjusted R2=0.56, F(6,339)=74.0, p<0.0001; 2. Kinship>0.05, adjusted R2=0.68, 












Figure S7. Females with more donors received more food in the contingency 
experiment. Means were calculated across all rounds for each bat, including eight 







Figure S8. Bats that fed more unrelated bats had more donors. Data based on 
2010-2014 food sharing network including 15 females (black) and 11 males (grey). 
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